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... 1 ONGRESS\ CVIVTAT-P /DOCUMENT 

»y 1 Session \ SENATE j No 3? 



PANAMA 

SPEECH 

OF 

HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE 

OF MASSACHUSETTS 

IN THE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

JANUARY 5, 1904 




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PRESENTED BY MR. McCUMBER 
June 9, 1921. — Ordered to be printed 



WASHINGTON 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1921 



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.L9 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
RECEIVED 

■JUt 121921 

OeOWMRNTS DIVISION 






PANAMA. 



Speech of Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge. 

The Senate having under consideration Senate resolution No. 66, submitted by 
Mr. Morgan December 18, 1903, that neither the President, nor the President and 
the Senate, as the treaty-making power of the United States, has the lawful power 
to wage or declare war against any foreign power without the consent of Congress, 
when such country is at peace with the United States, etc. — 

Mr. Lodge said: 

Mr. President, there is now pending before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations a treaty with the Republic of Panama. I have 
no intention of discussing that treaty or its terms. It would be 
manifestly improper for me to do so, because the terms and pro- 
visions of that treaty must be the subject of discussion in executive 
session. But the events, sir, which led to the making of that treaty 
are entirely public. They have been made the subject of much 
discussion here already and of much wider discussion in the press 
of the country. It is in regard to those events I desire to speak this 
morning. 

I wish first to say something about the., general law and the prece- 
dents affecting the right anH methods of the recognition of a new state. 
I feel as if I ought to apologize for entering upon a review of the 
authorities and the precedents, not merely because the subject is 
necessarily a dry one, but because all those precedents and all that 
law are or ought to be familiar .to- every Member of this body. But 
there have been so i many misstatement's in regard to the law and 
the precedents affecting the right of recognition by one country 
of the independence of another, there has been such a cloud of 
misapprehension resting upon the subject that it has seemed to 
me impossible to refrain from making some statement in regard to 
it. I shall try to be extremely brief in what I have to say on that 
subject; but I wish to bring the authorities together in such a manner 
that they can be easily examined by anyone who takes sufficient 
interest in the question to make such examination. 

I think, Mr. President, we may accept it as settled by all the 
writers on international law, as a general proposition, that a revolted 
state or colony may under certain circumstances be recognized as 
sovereign and independent by a neutral nation without thereby 
necessarily departing from an attitude of strict neutrality or giving 
just cause of offense to the parent state. The conditions necessary 
before such a recognition of independence is proper have been clearly 
defined by competent authorities. 

Halleck, in his International Law, says: 

When * * * a state changes its government or a province or colony that before 
had no separate existence is in the possession of the rights of sovereignty, the posses- 
sion of sovereignty de facto is taken to be possession de jure, and any foreign power 
is at liberty to recognize such sovereignty by treating with the possessor of it as an 
independent state. Where sovereignty is necessary to the validity of an act no 
distinction is or ought to be made between sovereignty founded on a good or bad 
title. * * * In international transactions possessin is sufficient. 



4 PANAMA. 

In Lawrence's Wheaton's International Law (pt. 1, chap. 2, 
p. 36) is found the following discussion of what actually constitutes 
sovereignty in a state : 

Sovereignty is acquired by a state either at the origin of the civil society of which 
it is composed or when it separates itself from the community of which it previously 
formed a part and on which it was dependent. * * * The internal sovereignty 
of a state does not in any degree depend upon its recognition by other states. * * * 
The existence of the state de facto is sufficient in this respect to establish its sovereignty 
de jure. It is a state because it exists. 

Precisely the same definition of a sovereign state is found also 
in Kluber, Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, section 23. 
Further, in Lawrence's Wheaton, page 47, is the following: 

Where a revolted province or colony has declared and shown its ability to main- 
tain its independence the recognition of its sovereignty by other foreign states is a 
question of policy and prudence only. 

And again, on page 48 of the same work, Lawrence's note No. 19, 
it is said : 

Before a formal recognition by sending ambassadors and entering into treaties by 
foreign powers, there should be a practical cessation of hostilities on the part of the 
old state which may long precede the theoretical renunciation of her rights, and 
there should be a consolidation of the new state so far as to be in a condition of main- 
taining international relations with other countries, an absolute bona fide possession 
of independence as a separate kingdom, not the enjoyment of perfect and undisturbed 
tranquillity— a test too severe for many of the oldest kingdoms — but there should be 
the existence of a government acknowledged by the people over whom it is set, and 
ready to prove its responsibility for their conduct when they come in contact with 
foreign nations. 

The same doctrine is declared in Historicus 1, page 9, by Sir 
William Vernon Harcourt, which was published at the time of our 
Civil War: 

Recognition of the independence of a revolted state is only lawful when such 
independence is de facto established. 

W. E. Hall, who, I take it, is the first of the English authorities 
and one of the most recent on international law, says: 

Assuming that the recognition of the Spanish-American republics by the United 
States and England may be taken as a typical example of recognition given upon 
unimpeachable grounds, and bearing in mind the principle that recognition can not 
be withheld when it has been earned, it may be said generally that— 
_ (1) Definitive independence can not be held to be established, and recognition 
is consequently not legitimate, so long as a substantial struggle is beino- maintained 
by the formerly sovereign state for the recovery of its authority; and that 
_ (2) A mere pretension on the part of the formerly sovereign state or a struggle so 
inadequate as to offer no reasonable ground for supposing that success may ulti- 
mately be obtained is not enough to keep abve the rights of the state and so to prevent 
foreign countries from falling under an obligation to recognize as a state the communitv 
claiming to have become one. . 

In a note of Dana's to Wheaton's International Law he says that the tests which 
should determine the recognition of a foreign state are "the necessities of the foreign 
recognizing state and the truth of the facts implied that the state treated with was°at 
the tame in the condition de facto of an independent state." (Extract and note 
from W. E. Hall's International Law, Part II, Chap. I, p. 93.) 

I will not multiply further citations from writers on international 
law, for I think it is perfectly clear to anyone who has examined 
the subject that they all unite in the proposition that the question 
of the recognition of a new state, whether formed originally or by 
separation from another state, is a question for the sole determina- 



PANAMA. 5 

tion of the recognizing power, that it is not necessarily in any sense 
an act of war, and that it may be done with a strict observance of 
neutrality. 

Before coming to the question of recognition, as illustrated by 
our own law and history and as carried out under our Constitution, 
I desire to say one single word in regard to a matter which has been 
used somewhat to cloud the question, and that is the introduction 
of the theory that because it is a case of secession the United States 
having prevented the secession of a portion of the States in a great 
civil war is thereby in some manner debarred from recognizing the 
independence of a seceding State elsewhere. 

Of course, Mr. President, to anyone who pauses to reflect upon it 
it is obvious at once that practically the only manner in which a 
new State can now be formed is by separation. It always must 
have been one of the modes in which a new State was formed. 
Therefore recognition must be given constantly to States which owe 
their origin to secession from a parent State or from another State. 

An effort has been made to show, as I have said, that there is a 
glaring inconsistency in our action on Panama. But this view 
will not bear examination. Although the question of the right of 
secession under the Constitution was elaborately discussed for 
many years preceding the war, and although that discussion may 
have served a useful purpose and was entirely characteristic of a 
race so fond of law as ourselves, it never to my mind had any very 
real significance. The right of secession in its essence has nothing 
to do with constitutions or law. Secession is revolution, and the 
right of secession is the right of revolution. It is purely a question 
of fact. Secession, even if it is from a loosely joined league which 
authorizes the withdrawal of one of the States forming the league 
is always destructive. In the case of a league the secession of a 
member changes its character and may lead to its dissolution. In 
the case of a government formed under a written constitution like 
our own, secession is revolution in its broadest sense. If it succeeds, 
a new nation is brought into being, as was the case with us in 1776. 
If it fails, it is only an abortive attempt at secession and revolution. 

The fact that France recognized us when we separated from 
England did not bind France to submit to the secession of a portion 
of her own territory. Frenchmen, I think, would have been much 
surprised if they had been told that because they recognized the 
United States they were therefore bound not to interfere with 
Brittanny or La Vendee when those Provinces rose against the 
government of the revolution. The fact that we recognized Texas 
when she separated from Mexico had no bearing on our acceding 
to the secession of the Southern States. We have recognized seceding 
States in South America, not only in the case of Texas but in other 
cases. The State which originally comprised Colombia herself, 
Venezuela and Ecuador, dissolved into three States, and we recog- 
nized the three new States. Within a few years some of the Central 
American States formed a confederation which we recognized, and 
when, as it happened, it quickly dissolved, we recognized once more 
the component parts. The right of secession, in short, has no 
bearing on the question of recognition. I shall have something to 
say later as to the constitutional position of Panama under the 



b PANAMA. 

several constitutions of Colombia, but that is simply to show the 
relation of Panama to Colombia, and has no bearing on the question 
of recognition, which is all I desire to deal with at this moment. 

I wish now, Mr. President, to say a word as to the general rule of 
the United States in regard to recognition, first in principle and 
then in practice. 

Turning from the general question of international law to the 
question of the established usage of the United States in the recog- 
nition of foreign governments or nations, it will be found that the 
United States has always assumed that the government de facto 
was the government de jure, and that in recognizing such a govern- 
ment the United States has consulted solely necessary questions of 
policy ,and 'prudence. When the Revolutionary Government of 
France was established after the overchrow of the monarchy, Gen. 
Washington had no hesitation in recognizing that Government and 
receiving its accredited minister. The same promptness of recog- 
nition was accorded to the Government of the Directorate, the 
Consulate, and the Empire, which followed in rapid succession the 
Government of the first French Republic. In regard to the recog- 
nition of the South American colonies of Spain after they had re- 
volted and established their independence, the following letter of 
Mr. Gallatin, United States minister at Paris, to Mr. J. Q. Adams, 
Secretary of State, November 5, 1818, clearly defines the attitude 
of the United States : 

We had not — 

He writes — 

either directly or indirectly, excited the insiirrection. It had been the spontaneous 
act of the inhabitants and the natural effect of causes which neither the United States 
nor Europe could have controlled. We had lent no assistance to either party; we 
had preserved a strict neutrality. But no European government could be surprised 
or displeased that in such a cause our wishes should be in favor of the success of the 
colonies or that we should treat as independent powers those among them which had 
in fact established their independence. 

Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. Monroe, President 
of the United States, of August 24, 1816 (MSS. Monroe Papers, 
Dept. of State), defines in the following manner the conditions 
which would lead the United States to recognize the independence 
of a foreign government or nation: 

There is a stage in such (revolutionary) contests when the party struggling for 
independence has, as I conceive, a right to demand its acknowledgment by neutral 
parties, and when the acknowledgment may be granted without departure Irom the 
obligations of neutrality. It is the stage when the independence is established as a 
matter of fact so as to leave the chance of the opposite party to recover their dominion 
utterly desperate. The neutral nation must, of course, judge for itself when this 
period has arrived. 

Practically the same doctrine is found in a note of Mr. Jefferson, 
Secretary of State, to Mr. Morris, November 7, 1792 (MSS. Inst. 

Ministers) : 

It accords with our principles, to acknowledge any government to be rightful 
which i3 formed by the will of the nation substantially declared. 

So, in a note to Mr. Anderson of May 27, 1823 (MSS. Inst. Minis- 
ters), Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, restates his position on this 
question as follows : 



PANAMA. 7 

When a sovereign has a reasonable hope of maintaining his authority over insur- 
gents the acknowledgment of the independence of such insurgents would be an 
international wrong. It is otherwise when such sovereign is manifestly disabled 
from maintaining the contest. 

The principle of recognizing a de facto government without re- 
gard to its nature or the manner in which it is established was 
again affirmed by Mr. Clay in a debate in the House of Representa- 
tives in March, 1818, on the proposition to appropriate $18,000 to 
defray the expenses of a minister to Buenos Aires. Mr. Clay said: 

We had constantly proceeded on the principle that the government de facto was 
that which we could alone notice, * * * and so far as we are concerned the 
sovereign de facto is the sovereign de jure. 

Almost the same words were employed by Mr. Van Buren, Sec- 
retary of State, in a note to Mr. Moore, June 9, 1829 (MSS. Inst. 
Am. St.): 

So far as we are concerned that which is the government de facto is equally so de jure. 

Again, Mr. Livingstone, Secretary of State, in a note to Sir Charles 
Vaughan, April 30, 1833 (MSS. Foreign Legation Notes), says: 

It has been the principle and the invariable practice of the United States to recog- 
nize that as the legal government of another nation which by its establishment in 
the actual exercise of political power might be supposed to have received the express 
or implied assent of the people. 

The same doctrine was even more forcibly expressed by Mr. Clay 
in a report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 
18, 1836 (S. Doc. 406, 24th Cong., 1st sess.) : 

The policy which has hitherto guided the Government of the United States in 
respect to new powers has been to act on the fact of their existence without regard to 
their origin whether that has been by the subversion of a preexisting government or by 
the violent or voluntary separation of one from another part of a common nation. 

Again, Mr. Forsyth, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. Castillo, 
the Mexican minister, March 17, 1837 (MSS. Notes Mex.), says: 

The independence of other nations has always been regarded by the United States 
as a question of fact merely and that of every people has been invariably recognized 
by them whenever the actual enjoyment of it was accompanied by satisfactory evi- 
dence of their power and determination permanently and effectually to maintain it. 

Almost the same language was used by Mr. Buchanan, Secretary 
of State, to Mr. Rush, United States minister to Paris, on March 31, 
1848 (MSS. Inst. France). He says: 

In its intercourse with foreign nations the Government of the United States has 
from its origin always recognized de facto governments. * * * It is sufficient 
for us to know that a government exists capable of maintaining itself, and then its 
recognition on our part inevitably follows. 

So Mr. Clayton, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. Donelson, 
July 8, 1849 (MSS. Inst. Prussia), says: 

We as a nation have ever been ready and willing to recognize any government de 
facto which appears capable of maintaining its power. 

The question was treated at length by Mr. Webster, Secretary of 
State, in a note to Mr. Hiilsemann, December 21, 1850 (MSS. Notes, 
Germ. St.) , in regard to the revolution in Hungary, which the United 
States had held itself in readiness to recognize had it been successful. 
He says: 

It is the right of every independent state to enter into friendly relations with every 
other independent state. Of course, questions of prudence naturally arise in refer- 



5 PANAMA. 

ence to new states brought by successful revolutions into the family of nations, but 
it is not to be required of neutral powers that they should await the recognition of 
the new government by the parent state. No principle of public law has been more 
frequently acted upon within the last 30 years by the great powers of the world than 
this. Within that period eight or ten new states have established independent 
governments within the limits of the colonial dominions of Spain on this continent 
and in Europe. The same thing has been done by Belgium and Greece. The 
existence of all these governments was recognized by some of the leading powers of 
Europe as well as by the United States before it was acknowledged by the states 
from which they had separated themselves. 

Again the question of recognizing a foreign state as independent 
was carefully discussed by President Jackson in his message to 
Congress, relating to Texas, of December 21, 1836. He says: 

The acknowledgment of a new state as independent and entitled to a place in the 
family of nations is at all times an act of great delicacy and responsibility, but more 
especially so when such state has forcibly separated itself from another of which it 
had formed an integral part and which still claims dominion over it. A premature 
recognition under these circumstances, if not looked upon as justifiable cause of war, 
is always liable to be regarded as a proof of an unfriendly spirit to one of the contend- 
ing parties. All questions relative to the government of foreign nations, whether 
of the Old or New World, have been treated by the United States as questions of fact 
only, and our predecessors have cautiously abstained from deciding upon them until 
the clearest evidence was in their possession to enable them not only to decide cor- 
rectly, but to shield their decisions from every unworthy imputation. 

Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. Culver, November 
19, 1862 (MSS. Int. Venez.), declared that— 

A revolutionary government is not to be recognized until it is established by the 
great body of the population of the state it claims to govern. 

The policy of the United States in regard to this matter was again 
declared by Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Sickles, December 
16, 1870. (MSS. Int. Spain, Foreign Relations, 1871.) 

It has been — • 

He says — 

the policy of the United States to recognize the governments de facto of the countries 
with which we hold diplomatic relations. Such was our course when the Republic 
was established in France in 1848 and again in 1870 and in each case accepted by the 
French people. Such was our course in Mexico when the Republic was maintained 
by the people of that country in spite of foreign efforts to establish a monarchy by 
military force. We have always accepted the general acquiescence of the people in 
the political change of government as a conclusive evidence of the will of the nation. 

Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. Baker, June 14, 
1879 (MSS. Inst. Venez.), discusses the question from the point of 
view of policy. He says : 

The capacity of a state in itself for recognition and the fact of recognition by other 
states are two_ different things. Recognition is not an act wholly depending on the 
constitutionality or completeness of a change of government, but is not infrequently 
influenced by the needs of the mutual relation between the two countries. * * * 
In other words, while the United States regard their international compacts and 
obligations as entered into with nations rather than with political governments, it 
behooves them to be watchful lest their course toward a government should affect 
the relations to the nation. Hence it has been the customary policy of the United 
States to be satisfied on this point, and doing so is in no wise an implication of doubt 
as to the legitimacy of the internal change which may occur in another state. 

From the extracts I have read I think the following conclusions 
may be drawn as to the principle adopted by the United States : 

First. It is an absolutely well-established principle of international 
law that in regard to the recognition of a new state or government 



PANAMA. y 

a neutral nation has but two questions before it: (a) Whether or 
not the new state or government is de facto established sufficiently 
to be answerable for its international obligations, and (b) whether 
or not it accords with the dictates of national prudence and policy 
to recognize it. If these two questions are answered affirmatively, 
the neutral nation may recognize without in any way departing from 
the strict observance of neutrality. The question of right is never 
considered. 

Second. The United States has throughout its history followed the 
above principles. It has always recognized de facto states and 
governments without the slightest regard to their origin or right, 
and the promptness of the recognition it has accorded to such de 
facto states or governments has been determined solely by questions 
of its national prudence and policy. Two extreme cases will illustrate 
this point. In the case of the revolution in Hungary the United 
States stood in readiness to recognize the revolutionary government 
before it was really established, and was only prevented from doing 
so owing to the fact that the revolution failed. Remonstrances were 
made by the diplomatic representatives of Austria, but there is no 
doubt that had the government of Kossuth ever been sufficiently 
successful to be recognized these remonstrances would have been of 
no avail, for they were powerless to prevent the President from 
taking all the preliminary steps to recognition. The fact was that 
the cause of Hungarian independence was extremely popular in the 
United States, and in addition the United States had nothing either 
to get or to fear from the Austrian Government. It therefore con- 
tented itself with remaining merely within the strict limits of neu- 
trality as defined in international law. 

In the case of the revolted colonies of Spain in South America, on 
the contrary, the recognition ^of the United States was delayed long 
after the time when the colonies were de facto independent and when 
hostilities had ceased on the part of Spain. The Spanish minister, 
Mr. De Omis, made constant complaints and protests to the Govern- 
ment of the United States in regard to supposed acts of assistance 
given to the revolted colonies by American citizens. All these com- 
plaints were carefully considered by the Department of State, and 
the Government preserved an absolutely inactive neutrality despite 
the sympathies of the people of the United States for the colonies 
and despite pressure from Congress. The reason of the delay was 
that, in the opinion of the Executive, it would have been contrary to 
the dictates of prudence and policy for the United States to have 
taken any action which might antagonize Spain in the condition of 
the country and the state of relations between the two nations at 
that time, for the United States was not then a strong power and the 
question of the cession of the Floridas was imminent. Therefore the 
United States construed the obligations of neutrality far more liberally 
in this case than in the case of Hungary, and was much slower to 
decide that the South American colonies were de facto independent. 
The same principle was maintained in both cases, but owing to ques- 
tions of policy its application was widely different. 

In other words, to repeat the proposition once more, the question 
of recognition is to be decided solely by the recognizing State on its 
own interests, wishes, and sympathies. All that is required in the 
recognized State is a de facto government in possession. 



10 PANAMA. 

Such was the nature of the recognition of the United States by- 
France. We had a revolutionary government. We had no con- 
stitution. The Articles of Confederation passed Congress just on the 
eve of the treaty of alliance, too late to have affected it in the slightest 
degree. France recognized the revolted colonies as an independent 
State when they had no constitutional government whatever, simply 
a revolutionary Congress sitting at Philadelphia. The attitude then 
taken by France is that which has been adopted by all nations, and 
by none more than the United States — that is, that it lies with the 
recognizing power to determine whether it is for her interest and in 
conformity to her sympathies and wishes to recognize the revolted 
State. 

Now, Mr. President, as to the methods and time of recognition. 
The President has been given by tht? Constitution the power to 
receive foreign ministers and ambassadors. By the language of the 
Constitution that power is given to him alone. I think if we consider 
the nature of that duty we shall see at once that the makers of the 
Constitution were guided, as they universally were, by common sense 
and by their knowledge of the practice of nations. It was impossible 
in dealing with foreign relations, which, in the language of Hamilton 
in the Federalist, above all others require " secrecy and dispatch," to 
leave them to the slow and clumsy operation of a legislative body 
which must be called together perhaps in order to meet the exigency. 
An emergency in foreign relations may easily arise during a recess of 
Congress. It may demand the most instant action on the part of the 
Executive, an action which the entire country would deem of the 
utmost necessity. Such action would be absolutely impracticable 
and impossible if the Executive was obliged to wait until Congress 
could be summoned in extraordinary session in order to take some of 
the steps which must be taken without delay in the foreign relations 
of any great country. I conceive that to be the explanation of the 
very simple clause in the Constitution which gives the President 
the right to receive foreign ministers. He also has the right to nom- 
inate and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint am- 
bassadors, ministers, and consuls. In other words, he has placed in 
his hands two methods of recognition, and on the principal method 
of recognition, that of receiving a minister from a State, there is no 
limitation placed whatever. The language of the Constitution, which 
I may properly repeat, is "the President shall receive ambassadors 
and other public ministers." 

I wish next to review, historically, the action which has been taken 
in practice by the United States and the authorities in regard to 
recognition since the foundation of the Government. Mr. Curtis, in 
his great work of authority, the Constitutional History of the United 
States, volume 1, page 580, says: 

As the President was to be the organ of communication with other Govern- 
ments, etc. — 

thus interpreting this passage of the Constitution to mean that all 
communications between the Government of the United States and 
foreign Governments shall be made solely through the President. 

In 1793 the question of recognizing the new French Republic, and 
whether or not the treaties with King Louis XVI were still binding, 



PANAMA. 11 

was discussed in the President's Cabinet, and there decided. A min- 
ister from the new Republic was accordingly received, and in view of 
the war between France and allied Europe a proclamation was issued 
by President Washington, in which he said: 

I have, therefore, thought fit to declare the disposition of the United States to ob- 
serve the conduct aforesaid (friendly and impartial) toward those powers, respectively, 
and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States. 

In other words, our first President, Washington, conceived that he 
had the right to recognize the new French Republic by receiving her 
minister, despite the division of parties on the question, and despite 
the fact that we had binding treaties with the France of the old 
monarchy. He went even further, however, than this when he took 
the ground that he had the right as the Chief Executive to declare the 
neutrality of the United States in the situation that had thus arisen. 
I think, Mr. President, that the action of Washington as interpreting 
the constitutional right of the President is one of the most significant 
that we have, especially as it comes at the very beginning of our 
Government. 

I ought to say that in the citations I am about to make on this 
point I am very largely indebted to two extremely valuable mem- 
oranda which were presented in 1898 by the Senator from Maine 
Mr. Hale]. I have added one or two citations which seem to me 
of importance, but anyone who desires to see with the utmost r mute- 
ness what the practice has been in that respect should consult those 
two memoranda, which were printed as Senate documents. 

The view taken by Washington of the constitutional powers of the 
Executive was strongly held by Mr. Ellsworth, a leading member of 
the convention which framed the Constitution, Senator from Con- 
necticut, and afterwards Chief Justice of the United States, when, in 
the Senate on January 6, 1796, on the motion of Mr. Tazewell to strike 
out a complimentary reply to the French Republic, he said that — 

Nothing could be found in the Constitution to authorize either branch of the legis- 
lature to keep up any kind of a correspondence with a foreign nation. 

Early in the nineteenth century the revolutions in South America 
made the question of recognition a very immediate and pressing one. 
Soon after the conclusion of our war with England in 1815 John 
Quincy Adams, in his Diary, speaking of the Cabinet, says : 

That at the time the questions were proposed whether the Executive was competent 
to acknowledge the independence of Buenos Aires, and, if so, whether it was expe- 
dient; that it had been concluded the Executive was competent, but that it was not 
expedient to take the step without the certainty of being supported in it by the public 
opinion, which, if decidedly favorable to the measure, would be manifested by 
measures of Congress. 

Therefore the Cabinet of President Monroe, after full discussion, 
John Quincy Adams being Secretary of State, decided that it was 
competent for them to recognize the independence of a revolted state. 

On the 11th of March, 1818, Vincente Pazos, representing himself 
as the deputed agent of the authorities acting in the name of the 
Republics of Venezuela, New Granada, and Mexico, presented to the 
House of Representatives, through the Speaker, a memorial com- 
plaining of "the occupation by the United States of Amelia Island." 
(Annals of Congress, first session, Fifteenth Congress, 1251.) 



12 PANAMA. 

Ail animated discussion immediately ensued. Forsyth said: 

The question, then, for the House to consider was whether, when the Constitution 
has placed the conduct of our foreign relations with the Executive, a foreign agent 
shall be permitted to appeal from the Executive to this House. (Ibid. 1262.) The 
House by a vote of 127 to 28 refused to receive the memorial. (Ibid. 1268.) 

At this same period, in the first session of the Fifteenth Congress, 
Mr. Clay, then Speaker, proposed to amend the appropriation bill 
under consideration by a clause appropriating $18,000 to defray the 
expenses of a minister to be sent to Buenos Aires, the capital of the 
united provinces of the Rio de la Plata, at the discretion of the Presi- 
dent. On this proposition there was much discussion in the House 
of Representatives during the month of March, 1818, and in the course 
of the debate one of the chief points under consideration was whether 
or not the House was competent to taite any step tending to the 
recognition of a foreign nation before action had been taken by the 
Executive in the matter and whether it was justified in urging the 
Executive by any legislative act to take such action. In the course 
of discussing this point the following opinions were expressed by 
various Members of the House at different times. 

Mr. Clay said that— 

He was perfectly aware that the Constitution of the United States — and he admitted 
the proposition in its broadest sense — confided to the Executive the reception and the 
deputation of ministers. But in relation to the latter operation Congress had a con- 
current will in the power of providing for the payment of their salaries. * * * 
There was great reason, Mr. Clay contended, from the peculiar character of the Amer- 
ican Government, in there being a perfect understanding between the legislative and 
executive branches in relation to the acknowledgment of a new power. * * * If 
contrary to his opinion, there were even a risk that the acknowledgment of a new 
State might lead to war, it was advisable that the step should not be taken without a 
previous knowledge of the will of the war-making branch. 

Mr. Forsyth, opposing the amendment, contended that — 

Heretofore the President and the Senate were left to the exclusive management of 
the foreign intercourse of the United States. 

Mr. Smith of Maryland said: 

The Constitution has given to Congress legislative powers, to the President the direc- 
tion of our intercourse with foreign nations. 

Mr. A. Smith of Virginia said : 

The Constitution grants to the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, 
power to appoint ambassadors and public ministers and to make treaties. According 
to the usage of the Government, it is the President who receives all foreign ntinisters 
and determines what foreign ministers shall or shall not be receh ed. It is by the 
exercise of some one of these powers in neither of which has this House any partici- 
pation, that a foreign power must be acknowledged. Then the acknowledgment of 
the independence of a new power is an exercise of Executive authority; consequently, 
for Congress to direct the Executive how he shall exercise this power is an act of usur- 
pation. 

Mr. Tucker of Virginia, speaking after Mr. Smith, contended that 
the House had the right to express its opinion on every subject, but 
admitted by implication that the recognition of a foreign nation was, 
in effect, a constitutional power of the Executive, which, however, he 
held should be exercised in conjunction with Congress if such a 
recognition might lead to war. 

Mr. H. Nelson of Virginia, the next speaker, said : 

When Washington saw cause to recognize the independence of France, did he wait 
for the sanction of Congress to judge whether or not he ought to receive a minister from 



PANAMA. 13 

that Government? He did not. In every view the course proposed was not recon- 
ciliable with the usages of the country, and because it was not, and, in his opinion, 
transcending the constitutional powers of Congress, he was unwilling, on great prin- 
ciples, to adopt this measure. 

Mr. Clay said : 

But the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. T owndes] has told us that the Consti- 
tution has wisely confided to the executive branch of the GoAernment the adminis- 
tration of the foreign concerns of the country . Has the honorable gentleman attempted 
to show (though his proposition be generally true and will neA er he controA erted by 
me) that we also have not our participation in the administration of the foreign in- 
terests of the country when we are called upon in our legislate e capacity to defray' 
the expenses of foreign missions or to regulate commerce? * * * There are 
three modes under our Constitution in which a nation may be recognized — by the 
Executive receiving a minister; secondly, by its sending one thither; and thirdly, 
this House unquestionably has the right to recognize in the exercise of the consti- 
tutional power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce. To receive a minister from 
a foreign power is an admission that the party sending them is soAereign and inde- 
pendent. So the sending a minister, as ministers are neA er sent but to so - * ereign 
powers, is a recognition of the independence of the power to. Avhom the minister is 
sent. 

Mr. Poindexter, of Mississippi, following Mr. Clav^, opposed the 
measure. He thought that, the matter of recognition being an 
Executive function, the House should take no action except after a 
minister to a foreign power was appointed to decide whether or 
not it would appropriate money for his expenses. 

Mr. Robertson, of Louisiana, said: 

Gen. Washington receiA'ed a minister from France when a political war was waged 
against her by all Europe combined. He recognized that Republic * * *. 

Mr. Spencer said: 

I believe most firmly that Ave have the constitutional power to legislate on this and 
every other subject connected with our foreign relations or Avith the regulation of com- 
merce. I hold it to be a power concurrent with that of the executiA r e branch. 

The amendment, after prolonged discussion, was finally rejected. 
In February, lg£l, Mr. Clay (the Speaker) introduced the fol- 
lowing resolution in the House of Representatives : 

That the House * * * -will give its constitutional support to the President of 
the United States whenever he may deem it expedient to recognize the soArereignty 
and independence of any of the said Provinces (South American colonies of Spain). 

This resolution is, of course, in itself an admission by the House 
of the President's power to recognize a foreign nation without 
consultation with Congress. 

Mr. Clay and others supported the resolution on the ground of 
general policy, maintaining, also, that "so far from interfering 
with the Executive prerogative it was a fair exercise of the un- 
doubted rights of the House." Other members opposed the reso- 
lution, maintaining that the matter was one wholly for the Execu- 
tive to decide, and that the House should not attempt to goad the 
Executive to action. 

Mr. Mercer, adverting to the supposed power of the President 
to recognize the independence of a government by receiving a 
minister, as well as by sending one, in which recognition the Sen- 
ate would have no voice, said that — - 

It became this House to share a part of the responsibility which the ExecutiA-e 
would incur by such a recognition. He doubted himself Arhether the President could 
recognize the independence of a foreign power by receiving a minister without the 
•consent of the House. 



14 PANAMA. 

Mr. Baldwin opposed the resolution on the ground that recog- 
nition of a foreign State should be made by all three branches of 
the Government and not by the President alone. 
Mr. Brown said- 
He believed the executive branch of the Government possessed of the constitutional 
power of performing those acts which would amount to a recognition. 

Mr. Smith of Maryland opposed on the ground that the resolu- 
tion " attributed to the President a power [that of recognition] 
tpo important to be exercised by any authority less than the three 
branches of the Government." 

Mr. Clay, with respect to the mode of recognition of foreign 
powers, reviewed the various opinions which had been expressed 
at different times as well as to-day on this subject. He concluded 
that both Congress and the Executive had this power, but that 
the most regular, ordinary, and usual course was by the Execu- 
tive, and it was therefore proper to assure him of the support of 
this House. That was the proposition Mr. Clay was trying to 
establish, but great as was his influence he failed to carry the 
House of Representatives with him on that theory at that time. 

On January 2, 1819, the Cabinet of President Monroe considered 
the question of the power to recognize Buenos Aires. Mr. Cal- 
houn advised acting in concurrence with Great Britain, which was 
only possible through Executive action. Mr. Crawford advised 
sending a minister — 

Because the Senate must then act upon the nomination, which would give their 
sanction to the measure. Mr. Wirt added that the House of Representatives must 
also concur by assenting to an act of appropriation. And the President, laughing, 
said that as those bodies had the power of impeachment over us, it would be quite 
convenient to have them thus pledged beforehand. 

Mi'. Adams thought that the first minister should come from the 
country seeking recognition, and said : 

As to impeachment, I was willing to take my share of risk of it for this measure when 
ever the Executive should deem it proper. And, instead of admitting the Senate or 
House of Representatives to anv share in the act of recognition, I would expressly 
avoid that form of doing it which would require the concurrence of those bodies. It 
was, I had no doubt, by our Constitution an act of the Executive authority. Gen. 
Washington had exercised it in recognizing the French Republic by the reception of 
Mr. Genet. Mr. Madison had exercised it by declining several years to receive, and 
by finally receiving, Mr. Onis; and in this instance I thought the Executive ought 
carefully to preserve entire the authority given him by the Constitution and not 
weaken it by setting the precedent of making either House of Congress a party to an 
act which it was his exclusive act and duty to perform. 

Mr. Crawford said: 

He did not, however, deny, but admitted, that the recognition was strictly within 
the powers of the Executive alone. (Diary of J. Q. Adams, vol. 4, pp. 204-206.) 

In 1833 Edward Livingston, a great lawyer and then Secretary of 
State, sent out a circular letter of instructions to the consular and 
diplomatic officers of the United States, which is as follows: 

No. 1.8.] Department of State, 

Washington, March 28 \ 1833. 
Henry Wheaton, Esq., 

Charge d' 'Affaires of the United States to Denmark. 
Sir: It is observed that special communications from foreign powers intended for 
the Executive of the United States have been usually addressed to the President and 
Congress of the United States. ■ 



PANAMA. 15 

This style was introduced under the old Confederation, and was then perfectly 
proper, but since the Federal Constitution has been formed its inaccuracy is apparent, 
the whole executive poiver, particularly that of foreign intercourse, being vested in the Presi- 
dent. You will therefore address a note to the minister for foreign affairs, apprising 
him that all communications made directly to the head of our executive government 
should be addressed "To the President of the United States of America," without 
any other addition. 

You will, of course, observe that this relates solely to those communications of cere- 
mony which are made from one sovereign to another — for example, notices of birth . 
deaths, changes in government, etc. — and does not relate to the ordinary diplomatic 
intercourse, which is to be carried on as usual through this department. 
I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Edward Livingston. 

President Jackson, in his message to Congress of December 21, 
1836, said: 

Nor has anv deliberate inquiry ever been instituted in Congress or in any of our 
legislative bodies as to whom belongs the power of originally recognizing a new State; 
a power the exercise of which is equivalent under some circumstances to a declaration 
of war; a power nowhere especially delegated and only granted in the Constitution, 
as it is necessarily involved in some of the great powers given to Congress, in that giA'en 
to the President and Senate to form treaties with foreign powers and to appoint ambas- 
sadors and other public ministers, and in that conferred upon the President to receive 
ministers from foreign nations. 

In the preamble to the resolution of the House of Representatives (the resolution 
referred to is as follows: "That the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged 
by the United States whenever satisfactory information should be received that it had 
in successful operation a civil government capable of performing the duties and ful- 
filling the obligations of an independent power") it is distinctly intimated that the 
expediency of recognizing the independence of Texas should be left to the decision of 
Congress. In this view on the ground of expediency I am disposed to concur, and do 
not, therefore, consider it necessary to express any opinion as to the strict constitu- 
tional right of the Executive either apart from or in conjunction with the Senate over 
the subject. It is to be presumed that on no future occasion will a dispute arise, as 
none has heretofore occurred, between the Executive and the Legislature in the 
exercise of the power of recognition. It will always be considered consistent with the 
spirit of the Constitution and most safe that it should be exercised, when probably 
leading to war, with the previous understanding with that body by whom war can 
alone be declared and by whom all the provisions for sustaining its perils must b< 
furnished . 

On June 18 of the same year, and referring to the same matter of 
the independence of Texas, Mr. Clay, in a report from the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations (S. Doc. No. 406, 24th Cong., 1st- 
sess.), said: 

The recognition of * * * an independent power may be made by the United 
States in various ways. First, by treaty; second, by the passage of a law regulating 
commercial intercourse between the two powers; third, by sending a diplomatic 
agent * * * with the usual credentials; or, lastly, by the Executive receiving 
and accrediting a diplomatic representative from the power in question, which would 
be a recognition as far as the Executive only is competent to make it. In the first 
and third modes the concurrence of the Senate in its executive capacity would be 
necessary, and in the second in its legislative character. 

The Senate alone, without the cooperation of some other branch of the Govern- 
ment, is not competent to recognize the existence of any power. 

The President of the United States, by the Constitution, has the charge of their 
foreign intercourse. Regularly he ought to take the initiative in the acknowledgment 
of the independence of any new power. But in this case he has not yet done it, 
for reasons which he, without doubt, deems sufficient. If, in any instance, the 
President should be tardy, he may be quickened in the exercise of his power by the 
expression of the opinion, or by other acts, of one or both branches of Congress, as was 
done in relation to the Republics formed out of Spanish America. 



16 PANAMA. 

Together with this report a resolution was submitted to the Senate 
from the Committee on Foreign Relations that was as follows: 

Resolved, That the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by the United 
States whenever satisfactory information shall be received that it has in successful 
operation a civil government capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the 
obligations of an independent power. 

On July 1, 1836, this resolution being in debate in the Senate, Mr. 
Webster said he was willing to go so far as to vote funds to enable 
the President to send out a proper minister, but against a direct 
recognition he thought there existed strong objections, because it 
was the proper function of the President to take the lead in this 
matter. 

In a debate in the House in the following year John Quincy Adams 
said (Feb. 27, 1837) he objected to the proposition before the House 
on the ground that the act of recognition of a foreign power had here- 
tofore always been an Executive act of this Government. It was 
the business and duty of the President of the United States, and he 
(Mr. A.) was not willing to set the example of giving that recognition 
on the part of the legislative body without recommendation of the 
Executive. 

In a note from Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to Mr. Rush, on 
March 31, 1848 (MSS. Inst. France), we find the following language: 

It was right and proper that the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary 
from the United States should be the first to recognize, so far as his powers extended, 
the provisional government of the French Republic. 

A passage in President Polk's special message to Congress of April 
3, 1848, also distinctly implies the power of the President, through 
his ministers, to recognize the existence of a foreign Government. 
He says : 

The prompt recognition of the new Government by the representative of the United 
States at the French Court maets my full and unqualified approbation, and he has 
been authorized in a suitable manner to make known this fact to the constituted 
authorities of the French Republic. 

President Taylor, in his first annual message to Congress of De- 
cember 4, 1849, says: 

For this purpose I invested an agent then in Europe with the power to declare 
our willingness promptly to recognize her (Hungary) independence in the event of 
her ability to sustain it. 

There a President authorized an agent to recognize the inde- 
pendence of a country contingent on the happening of some future 
event. 

President Taylor again, in a special message to Congress, March 

28, 1850, says: 

My purpose, as freelv avowed in this correspondence, was to have acknowledged 
the independence of Hungary had she succeeded in establishing a government de 
facto on a basis sufficiently permanent in its character to have justified me in doing so. 

Thereby he clearly asserted his right as President of the United 
States to recognize the revolutionary government of Hungary with- 
out congressional action of any kind. 

In 1864 the House passed a resolution in regard to the attempt of 
France to set up the empire of Maximilian in Mexico. Mr. Seward 
writes that the French minister, having asked an explanation of the 



PANAMA. 17 

resolution, he inclosed it, with the statement that it " truly interprets 
the uniform sentiment of the people of the United States in regard 
to Mexico." He says, further: 

It is, however, another and distinct question whether the United States would 
think it necessary or proper to express themselves in the form adopted by the House 
of Representatives at this time. This is a practical and purely executive question, 
and a decision of it constitutionally belongs, not to the House of Representatives, 
nor even Congress, but to the President of the United States. 

Again, Mr. Seward, in a note to Mr. Dayton, of April 7, 1864 
(MSS. Inst. France), says: 

The question of recognition of foreign revolutionary or reactionary governments is 
one exclusively for the Executive and can not be determined internationally by 
congressional action. 

President Grant, in his second annual message, 1870, says: 

As soon as I learned that a Republic had been proclaimed at Paris, and that the 
people of France had acquiesced in the change, the minister of the United States 
was directed by telegraph to recognize it and to tender my congratulations and those 
of the people of the United States. 

Still another precedent for the recognition of a foreign Government 
by the President or officers appointed by him is found in a note from 
Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Sickles, December 16, 1870 (MSS. 
Inst. Spain, Foreign Relations, 1871) : 

Should there be circumstances which lead you to doubt the propriety of recog- 
nizing the Duke of Aosta as King of Spain, it will be easy to communicate with the 
department by telegraph and ask instructions. Should there be no such circum- 
stances, the general policy of the United States, as well as their interests in the present 
relations with Spain, call for an early and cheerful recognition of the change which 
the Nation has made. 

In 1876 the Republic of Pretoria sent us certain resolutions of 
congratulations on our centennial celebration of the Declaration of 
Independence. Congress passed a resolution of acknowledgment. It 
went to the President. Nothing could have been more harmless or 
have met with more uniform agreement. But on January 26, 1877, 
President Grant vetoed the resolutions on constitutional grounds (p. 
1112). His veto message was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and never reported therefrom. The President said : 

Sympathizing as I do in the spirit of courtesy and friendly recognition which has 
prompted the passage of these resolutions. I can not escape the conviction that their 
adoption has inadvertently involved the exercise of a power which infringes upon 
the constitutional rights of the Executive. * * * The Constitution of the United 
States, following the established usage of nations, has indicated the President as the 
agent to represent the national sovereignty in its intercourse with foreign powers, and to 
receive all official communications from them, * * * making him, in the language 
of one of the most eminent writers on constitutional law, "the constitutional organ 
of communication with foreign states." If Congress can direct the correspondence 
of the Secretary of State with foreign governments, a case very different from that 
now under consideration might arise, when that officer might be directed to present 
to the same foreign government entirely different and antagonistic views or statements. 

He vetoed, therefore, a mere resolution of acknowledgment, in 
response to a resolution from the Republic of Pretoria congratu- 
lating us on our centennial anniversary, and he did so upon the 
ground that the whole conduct of our foreign relations rested in 
executive hands and not even so slight an invasion of it as that 
could be permitted. 

S. Doc. 37, 67-1 2 



18 PANAMA. 

In a note to Mr. Christiancy, May 9, 1881 (MSS. Inst. Peru, 
Foreign Relations, 1881), Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, says: 

If the Calderon government is supported by the character and intelligence of Peru 
* * * you may recognize it as the existing provisional government. 

And in relation to the same matter President Arthur, in his third 
annual message to Congress, 1883, says: 

When the will of the Peruvian people shall be manifested I shall not hesitate to 
recognize the government approved by them. 

Also the power of the President or officers appointed by him to 
recognize a new government is distinctly implied in a note from 
Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, to Mr. Logan, March 17, 
1884. (MSS. Inst. Chile.) He says: 

The Department of State will not recognize a revolutionary government claiming 
to represent the people in a South American state until it is established by a free 
expression of the will of that people. 

Thus, Mr. President, I have reviewed the action and the inter- 
pretations based upon that clause of the Constitution which au- 
thorizes the President to receive foreign ministers as a full and 
exclusive power of recognition by a series of Presidents and Secre- 
taries of State. I now wish to call attention to the decisions of 
the Supreme Court and to the opinions of writers upon constitutional 
law. 

By the act of February 28, 1795 (1 Stats. L. 424), Congress specially 
delegated to the President the power to decide whether a government 
organized in a State (of the Union) is the duly constituted government 
of that State, and this power of the President was reaffirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden (7 Howard), the celebrated case 
growing out of the trouble in Rhode Island, known as the "Dorr 
rebellion." In that case, Mr. Webster, who appeared for the defend- 
ant in error, said : 

How did the President of the United States treat this question? Acting under the 
Constitution and law of 1795, he decided that the existing government was the one 
which he was bound to protect. He took his stand accordingly, and we say that this 
is obligatory upon this court, which always follows an executive recognition of a 
foreign government. 

Webster made that statement in argument, and in the decision, 
Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of the court, said: 

In the case of foreign nations the government acknowledged by the President is 
always recognized in the courts of justice. 

Mr. President, it is pretty hard to go beyond that statement as 
a recognition by the Supreme -Court of the power of the President 
to recognize foreign governments. 

United States v. Hutchings (2 Wheeler's Criminal Cases, 543), 
in 1817, was a prosecution for piracy. The question arose whether 
at a certain date the Republic of Buenos Aires was independent. 
Counsel argued that our independence began with the Declara- 
tion of Independence in 1776, and therefore that the independence 
of Buenos Aires "commenced with their declaration of independ- 
ence," was a matter of notoriety throughout the world, and was 
proved by certain correspondence between President Monroe and 
the Spanish minister. Chief Justice Marshall was of opinion — ■ 

That a nation became independent from its declaration of independence only as 
respects its own government and the various departments thereof. That before it 



PANAMA. 19 

could be considered independent by the judiciary of foreign nations it was necessary 
that its independence should be recognized by the executive authority of those 
nations; that as our Executive had never recognized the independence of i'uenos 
Aires, it was not competent to the court to pronounce its independence. 

Here we have the decision of Marshall to add to that of Taney 
as well as to the statement of Mr. Webster in argument. 

In United States v. Palmer (3 Wheat., 610, 634), arising two 
months later, the Chief Justice used language applicable to the 
legislative as well as to the executive department, and this is the 
only exception to the general rule above stated in regard to such 
cases. 

Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company (3 Sumn., 270, 273) in- 
volved the question whether the fisheries at the Falkland Islands 
belonged to Buenos Aires. It was decided by Mr. Justice Story, 
whose remarks are of especial interest because he had discussed 
this very question in his commentaries on the Constitution, and 
had, according to the general plan of the commentaries, left it 
there an open one. He now said: 

It is - ery clear that it belongs exclush ely to the executr e department of our Co em- 
inent to recognize from time to time any new governments which may arise in the 
political resolutions of the world; and until such new go ernrr.ents are so recognized 
they can not be admitted by our courts of justice to have or to exercise the common 
rights and prerogatives of sovereignty. 

Mr. Justice Story further goes on to say that "this doctrine was 
fully recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Gelston v. Hoyt (3 Wheat., 246, 324)." In that case the opinion 
had been written by himself and used simply the word "govern- 
ment." The learned justice's interpretation of the opinion would 
indicate that whenever the word "government" had been used in 
this connection the executive department has been intended; and 
it is also noticeable that the case thus referred to was decided at the 
same term of court with the Palmer case above referred to; so that 
these remarks of Mr. Justice Story tend to confirm the inference which 
may be drawn from, the Hutchings case, that the reference to the 
legislative department of the Government in the Palmer case was an 
inadvertence. We now can add Story to the authority of Marshall 
and Taney. 

Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company, above quoted, came up 
for review in the Supreme Court of the United States (13 Pet., 415). 
Mr. Justice McLean said (p. 420) : 

And there can be no doubt that when the executive branch of the Government, 
which is charged with our foreign relations, shall in its correspondence with a foreign 
nation assume a fact in regard to the sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclu- 
sive on the judicial department. And in this view it is not material to inquire, nor 
is it the province of the court to determine, whether the Executive be right or wrong. 
It is enough to know that in the exercise of his constitutional functions he has decided 
the question. Having done this under the responsibilities which belong to him-, it is 
obligatory on the people and the Government of the Union. 

In Kennett v. Chambers (14 How., 30) the question arose whether 
Texas was an independent government in September, 1836. Chief 
Justice Taney said (p. 46) that it "belonged to the Government" 
to decide when Texas became independent. He then refers to the 
President's message of December 22, 1836, as evidence that it had 
not yet become independent at that time, and says (pp. 50-51) : 

It is a sufficient answer to the argument to say that the question whether Texas 
had or had not at that time become an independent State was a question for that 
department of government exclusively v:hich is charged vnth our foreign relations. 



20 PANAMA. 

The department thus referred to is clearly indicated by its fur- 
ther characterization (p. 51) as "the treaty -making power. " 

The Prize Cases (2 BL, 635) are not strictly in point, because 
they refer to domestic, not to foreign, difficulties. Mr. Justice 
Grier (p. 670), however, says: 

Whether the President, in fulfilling his duties as commander in chief, in suppres" 
sing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance and a civil war of 
such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the character of 
belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this court must be governed 
by the decisions and acts of the 'political department of the Government, to which 
this power teas intrusted. 

The italics are the court's own. 

In the recent case of the United States v. Trumbull (48 Fed. Rep., 
99, 104), referring to the late civil war in Chile, Judge Ross says: 

It is beyond question that the status of the people composing the Congressional 
Party at the time of the commission of the alleged offense is to be regarded by the 
court as it was then regarded by the political or executive department of the United 
States. This doctrine is firmly established. 

In the Rata (56 Fed. Rep., 505, 510) the circuit court of appeals 
for the ninth circuit, speaking through Judge Hawley, said : 

The law is well settled that it is the duty of the courts to regard the status of the 
Congressional Party in the same light as they were regarded by the executive depart- 
ment of the United States at the time the alleged offenses were committed. 

The law and practice as to appointing and receiving ministers 
and consuls has been elaborately set forth and discussed by Caleb 
Cushing (7 Op. Attys Gen., p. 242), who concludes: 

Further, to show that this act can not be reasonably construed as intending to 
require the President to do what the Constitution, on considerations of public policy, 
has intrusted to the sole discretion of the Executive, may be mentioned the clause 
of the act which says, in words, that the President shall appoint a "consul" at Port- 
au-Prince. This, if done, would have the effect, according to international usage, 
of placing the Haytien Empire in diplomatic relation with the United States. It is 
not presumed that such was the purpose of the lawmakers; yet such is the necessary 
effect of the law. if the words ' ' shall appoint " are mandatory in operation. If they are 
mandatory in any case, they are in all ; if not mandatory in one case, they are so in 
none. * * * 

The President can, with concurrence of the Senate, appoint consuls at any place 
whatever, whether they be mentioned in the act or not. 

I will now cite the writers upon our Constitution : 
In W. Rawle's View of the Constitution of the United States, 
pages 195 and 196, is found the following in regard to the Pres- 
ident's power of recognition of a foreign nation : 

The power of receiving foreign ambassadors carries with it, among other things, 
the right of judging, in the case of a revolution in a foreign country, whether the new 
rulers ought to be recognized. The Legislature, indeed, possesses a superior power 
and may declare its dissent from the Executive recognition or refusal; but until that 
sense is declared the act of the Executive is binding. 

The power of Congress on this subject can not be controlled. They may, if they 
think proper, acknowledge a small and helpless community, though with the certainty 
of drawing a war upon our country: but greater circumspection is required from the 
President, who, not having the constitutional power to declare war, ought ever to 
abstain from a measure likely to produce it. 

Judge Story says, in his Commentaries on the Constitution (2 
Story on the Constitution, sees. 1566 and 1567) : 

But a much more delicate occasion is when a civil war breaks out in a nation, and 
two nations are formed, or two parties in the same nation, each claiming the sover- 
eignty of the whole, and the contest remains as yet undecided, flagrante bello. * * * 



PANAMA. 21 

The exercise of this prerogative of acknowledging new nations or ministers is, therefore, 
under such circumstances, an executive function of great delicacy, which requires 
the utmost caution and deliberation. * * * If such recognition is made it is con- 
clusive upon the nation, unless, indeed, it can be reversed by an act of Congress 
repudiating it. If, on the other hand, such recognition lias been refused by the 
Executive, it is said that Congress may, notwithstanding, solemnly acknowledge the 
sovereignty of the nation or party (citing Rawle). These, however, are propositions 
which have hitherto remained as abstract statements under the < 'onstitution. and 
therefore can be propounded, not as absoluetly true, but as still open to discussion 
if they should ever arise in the course of our foreign diplomacy. The Constitution 
has expressly invested the Executive with power to receive ambassadors and other 
ministers, ft has not expressly invested Congress with the power either to repudiate 
or acknowledge them. * * * 

That a power so extensive in its reach over our foreign relations could not proper!/; be 
conferred on any other than the executive department will admit of h . That it 

should be exclusively confided to that department without any participation of the 
Senate in the functions (that body being conjointly intrusted with the treaty-making 
power) is not so obvious. Probably the circumstance that in ail foreign governments 
the power was exclusively confided to the executive department, and the utter imprac- 
ticability of keeping the Senate constantly in session, and the suddenness of the 
emergencies which might require the action of the Government, conduced to the 
establishment of the authority in its present form. It is not. indeed, a power likely 
to be abused, though it is pregnant with consequences often involving the question 
of peace or war. And in our short experience the revolutions in France and the 
revolutions in South America have already placed us in situations to feel its critical 
character and the necessity of having at "the head of the Government an Exec 
of sober judgment, enlightened views, and firm and exalted patriotism. 

Clearly only the general plan of not deciding open questions in 
these commentaries was the learned justice's only reason for not 
more positively expressing dissent from the propositions of Mr. 
Rawle; and, as has already been shown, his views upon this point 
were in accord with those of Chief Justice Marshall as expressed 
upon the Hutchings trial in 1817. He refers also to the chapter 
on M. Genet and the neutrality proclamation of 1793, in Marshall's 
Life of Washington, and all through that chapter it is clear that 
the Chief Justice agrees with Washington and his Cabinet in con- 
sidering the recognition of a new government to be an Executive 
function. 

Mr. Pomeroy is much more positive in the statement of his opinion. 
He says (Pomeroy's Constitutional Law, pp. 669, 670, and 672) : 

All foreign relations are thus confided exclusively to the President or to him in 
connection with the Senate. * * * 

Of the unlimited extent and transcendent importance of this function thus con- 
fided to the Executive, either alone or in connection with the Senate, there can be 
no doubt. * * * 

Congress may pass resolves in relation to questions of an international character, 
but these can only have a certain moral weight; they have no legal effect; they can 
not bind the Executive. The necessity for this is evident; negotiations generally 
require a certain degree of secrecy; one mind and will must always be more efficient 
in such matters than a large deliberative assembly. * * * 

The President can not declare war; Congress alone possesses this attribute. But 
the President may, without any possibility of hindrance from the legislature, so con- 
duct the foreign intercourse, the diplomatic negotiations with other Governments, as 
to force a war, as to compel another nation to take the initiative: and this step once 
taken the challenge can not be refused. 

Mr. Wharton expresses his opinion in the following headnote: 
'•'Such recognition determinable by Executive." (Wharton's Inter- 
national Law Digest, 2d ed., p. 551.) 

The number of instances in which the Executive has recognized a new foreign 
power without consulting Congress (because not anticipating consequences which 
made such consultation necessary) has been very great. No objection has been 



22 PANAMA. 

made by Congress in any of these instances. Trie legislative power has thus for 100 
years impliedly confirmed the view that the right to recognize a new foreign Govern- 
ment belonged to the Executive; and if it is correct doctrine that the same power 
can not be exercised for the same purposes by two different branches of the Govern- 
ment, this implied approval is conclusive of the whole present controversy. (54th 
Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. 56.) 

I should like next briefly to call attention to what the United 
States, acting upon the principles just stated, has done in practice 
as to the time accorded before recognition was given and as to the 
manner in which recognition was given. 

In the case of the French Republic of 1793, President Washington 
received Monsieur Genet, and recognized the Republic in that way. 

The President authorized the recognition of the Empire in 1804 
through sending a new letter of credence to our minister. He 
recognized the monarchy of 1814 in the same way. When the 
Republic of 1848 was proclaimed on the morning of February 25, 
it was recognized by Mr. Rush, the American minister, on the 28th, 
three days later. That action was executive. It was within three 
days, and it was approved by the President. The second Empire 
was recognized in the same manner. 

The Republic of 1870 was recognized by the Executive through 
our minister, Mr. Washburn, after an interval of two days. There 
was then no constitution established in France; it was a purely 
revolutionary government, and the Republic was recognized by us 
with the utmost rapidity. The telegrams are cited in the Senate 
document presented by the Senator from Maine [Mr. Hale] in the 
Fifty-fourth Congress. 

When Brazil threw off the imperial rule, the minister telegraphed : 

Legation op the United States, 

Rio de Janeiro, November 17, 1889. 
The imperial family sailed to-day. Government de facto, with ministry, estab- 
lished. Perfect order maintained. Important we acknowledge Republic first. 

Adams. 
Mr. Blaine telegraphed to Mr. Adams: 

Department op State, 
Washington, November 19, 1889. 
You will maintain diplomatic relations with the provisional government of Brazil. 

Blaine. 

Thus we recognized the new Government within two days. 

The Central American Federation was recognized by the Presidents 
reception of Mr. Canaz as envoy extraordinary in 1824. The King- 
dom of Hawaii was recognized in 1826 by Capt. Jones, a naval officer, 
being sent there by the Executive to negotiate a treaty. The United 
States recognized the existence of Belgium by the issuance of an 
exequatur to the Belgian consul at New York — a purely Executive 
act. The President recognized Texas by sending Mr. La Branche as 
charge d'affaires. Again, when the independence of Greece was 
recognized, it was an Executive act through our minister in London. 

In the case of Hungary, to which I have already alluded, President 
Taylor sent an agent out to recognize Hungary the moment it could 
be said the revolution was in any degree successful. The recognition 
of the Republic of Haiti was an Executive act, as were the recogni- 
tions of the Republic of Liberia, the Dominican Republic, the King- 



PANAMA. 23 

dom of Korea, the Empire of Germany, the Orange Free State, the 
Principality of Rumania, Serbia, and the Congo Free State. Costa 
Rica was recognized by the reception of a minister. Guatemala. 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, the Greater Republic of Central 
America in 1896, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, the Peru- 
Bolivian Confederation, Uruguay, Venezuela, New Granada, and 
the Kingdom of Samoa were all recognized by Executive act. In 
every instance it was a case of purely Executive recognition, almost 
all by the method of receiving a minister. 

My proposition, therefore, as to the recognition of a State and 
Government, is that it is primarily and may be, as has always hap- 
pened, an exclusively Executive function. The precedents are 
uniform to a most extraordinary degree. The position has been 
held by every Secretary of State, I think, without exception; it has 
been held by the Supreme Court in the cases I have read that the 
Executive recognition is the only recognition admitted by the courts, 
and I do not think it is possible to go beyond that. 

The other method of recognition in the Constitution is by the 
clause which gives the President the right to nominate ambassadors, 
ministers, and consuls. Recognition has almost invariably occurred 
in what Mr. John Quincy Adams pointed out to be the best and most 
proper way — the reception of a minister from the State seeking inde- 
pendence — but the power of the President to nominate a minister 
where no such office had been created by Congress and which, there- 
fore, implies his ability to recognize in that way, has been estab- 
lished beyond a doubt. I have heard the right of the President to 
nominate a minister to Panama questioned because no such office 
had been created by Congress, and I thought it would not be amiss 
to call the attention of the Senate to the practice in that respect. 

On December 22, 1791, President Washington sent a message to 
the Senate nominating Gouverneur Morris, Thomas Pinckney, and 
William Short as ministers to Paris, London, and The Hague, respec- 
tively. There were no provisions of law for any such officers. Vari- 
ous motions declaring that there was no need for these missions were 
debated and were rejected, and the nominations of Morris and 
Pinckney were confirmed. A similar motion was made that there 
was no occasion for a minister to The Hague, and that was postponed 
until the following Monday, when it was taken up and defeated, and 
immediately after the nomination of a minister to The Hague was 
confirmed. 

On the 16th of April, 1794, Washington nominated John Jay as 
envoy extraordinary to Great Britain. Mr. Pinckney was minister 
plenipotentiary, but he was not envoy extraordinary, which office 
did not exist. President Washington, therefore, nominated Mr. Jay 
to aH office which had no existence. He was confirmed by the 
Senate. 

On the 6th of February, 1799, John Adams nominated Rufus King 
minister to Russia. No such office existed. He said in the nomi- 
nating message that it was to open relations with Russia. No 
action was taken, and the Russian mission was not established until 
1809, I think, when Mr. John Quincy Adams was sent. 



24 PANAMA. 

On the 29th day of May, 1813, Mr. Madison nominated a minister 
to Sweden to open diplomatic relations with that country. No 
such office had been created by Congress. 

John Adams sent in the names of Ellsworth and Patrick Henry 
to be commissioners to France in conjunction with William Vans 
Murray. No such offices existed. 

On the 11th of January, 1803, Jefferson nominated Livingston 
to negotiate with France and Charles Pinckney to negotiate with 
Spain in conjunction with Monroe. No such offices existed. 

Until Mr. Madison's second term appropriations for the Diplo- 
matic Service were made in a lump sum, and Congress thus left it 
for many years to the Executive to appoint ministers when he 
pleased without ever taking any action which could be construed 
as the creation of any one of these offices. 

Of course, Mr. President, with the extension of our Diplomatic 
Service cases of nominating to offices for which there is no appro- 
priation have practically disappeared, but the cases which I have 
cited — of Washington, John Adams, and Madison — show that the 
men most familiar with the Constitution in its early days conceived 
that they had an entire right to nominate a minister to a country 
where there was no provision for a mission made by Congress, and 
that the Senate in all instances confirmed those nominations just as 
if a specific appropriation had been made, thereby recognizing the 
right of the President. It is a method by which recognition could 
be extended. It is a method which, in practice, has not lately 
been used at all for that purpose, because very naturally the recep- 
tion of the minister or ambassador of the State seeking recognition 
has been the obvious way to meet it. 

Mr. President, I have tried to lay down the general international 
law; I have tried to show the general practice of the Government of 
the United States and the precedents which we have in regard to it. 
Having shown, as I believe, that all the authorities hold that recog- 
nition is an Executive function which can not be invaded or dimin- 
ished by the legislative body, that whatever dangers it may carry 
the Constitution has placed it in executive hands, I now come to the 
exercise of that right in the present case of Panama. The right of 
the President to recognize being demonstrated by law and precedent, 

1 wish to inquire whether that undoubted right has been properly 
exercised in this particular case? 

In section 4 of the act approved June 28, 1902, which provided 
for the construction of the canal, occur these words: 

That should the President be unable to obtain for the United States a satisfactory 
title to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and the control of the neces- 
sary territory of the Republic of Colombia and the rights mentioned in sections 1 and 

2 of this act, within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, then the President, 
having first obtained for the United States perpetual control by treaty of the neces- 
sary territory from Costa Rica and Nicaragua upon terms which he may consider 
reasonable, for the construction, perpetual maintenance, operation, and protection 
of a canal connecting the Caribbean Sea with the Pacific Ocean by what is com- 
monly known as the Nicaragua route, etc. 

In other words, the President was instructed by that act to secure 
a right of way through a given piece of territory with a view to 
building a canal. It was entirely secondary and of no vital impor- 
tance to whom that territory belonged. At that time that territory 
was within the boundaries of the Republic of Colombia, and Colom- 



PANAMA. 25 

bia sought to make a canal treaty with us. If Senators will turn 
to page 18 of Senate Document No. 51, Fifty-eighth Congress, they 
will see there a letter from Mr. Hay to Mr. Beaupre, in which he says: 

The canal negotiations were initiated by Colombia, and were energetically pressed 
upon this Government for several years. The propositions presented by Colombia, 
with slight modifications, were finally accepted by us. In virtue of lids agreement 
our Congress -reversed its previous judgment and decided upon the Panama route. 

In other words, the treaty was sought by Colombia, had been 
sought by Colombia for years, and was made with Colombia on the 
terms she asked, with comparatively slight modifications. The 
treaty was dated the 22d of January, 1903. As to the character of 
the treaty, which is fresh in everybody's mind, I need only say that 
the sole objection that I heard made to it in the Senate — and that 
sole objection was made at considerable length and during a pretty 
long period of time — was that we went a great deal too far in what 
we conceded to Colombia. Therefore Colombia sought the treaty; 
she got the treaty; she got what she asked, with trifling modifica- 
tions, and she got concessions which it was very difficult for many 
of us to accede to, and which only the universal desire for the build- 
ing of the canal made it possible for us to accept. 

Now, what was the treatment of that treat} 7 by Colombia? I 
wish to call attention 

Mr. Daniel. Will the Senator from Massachusetts allow me to 
interrupt him for a moment ? 

Mr. Lodge. Certainly. 
. Mr. Daniel. Before the Senator speaks on that subject, I should 
be very glad if he would state whether or not the Department of 
Panama took part in that action of Colombia; and, if so, what part? 

Mr. Lodge. I will answer the question in one moment. 

Mr. Daniel. I have seen it stated that one or more of the revo- 
lutionary consuls of Panama took part in the action of the Colombian 
Congress, but I have not been able 

Mr. Lodge. The Senator means in the Congress which discussed 
the treaty? 

Mr. Daniel. Which discussed and rejected the treaty. 

Mr. Lodge. I have analyzed that very carefully and will show the 
Senator from Virginia exactly what the representatives of Panama 
did. 

Mr. Daniel. I wish the Senator would do so. 

Mr. Lodge. When the treaty reached Bogota, Colombia — as I 
think I shall be able to show by the extracts I shall read from Mr. 
Beaupre 's correspondence — from the beginning sought to extort 
more money from the United States and from the company, and it will 
appear also that the feelings of Panama found very early expression. 
Mr. Beaupre, whom I know only from this correspondence which 
has been sent to the Senate, appears to me to have been a man of 
great clearness of vision, great firmness, and great tact. I think 
the correspondence does him the utmost credit, and I think anyone 
who will read it will agree with me on that point. 

On page 7 of his correspondence, on April 24, 1903 — see how early 
that was — he sa,js to Mr. Hay : 

1 have the honor to refer to your telegram of the 7th instant, confirmed elsewhere, 
in regard to the negotiations for the cancellation of the present concessions of the 
Panama canal and railroad companies. 



26 PANAMA. 

Now, in the first article of that treaty, as he points out in the letter 
of April 28— 

The Government of Colombia authorizes the New Panama Canal Co. to sell 
and transfer to the United States its rights, privileges, properties, and concessions, as 
well as the Panama Railroad and all the shares or parts of shares of said company. 

In other words, the very first thing that Colombia did after the 
treaty had been ratified by our Senate was to try to destroy and 
annul the concessions which in that treaty she agreed should be 
continued to the Panama Canal Co. It was clearly in violation 
of the treaty which her own representatives had signed. 

On the 4th of May Mr. Beaupre writes to Mr. Hay: 

Private discussion, which perhaps more clearly reflects the real situation, is to the 
effect that the price is inadequate ; that a much greater sum of money can be obtained, 
:and that the United States can be obligated to guarantee the sovereignty of Colombian 
ports outside the Department of Panama against the invasion or seizure by foreign 
enemies. The one great determining point, however, is the belief that the price can 
be greatly augmented. 

That was on May 4. They were trying already to get more money 
out of it. 

Now, on the 7th of May — and this is the first allusion to what the 
Senator from Virginia asked me — he says: 

The probabilities are that when the measure is presented to Congress there will be a 
lengthy debate and an adverse vote. Then the representatives of the coast Depart- 
ments of the Cauca, Panama, and Bolivar will ask for a reconsideration, and urge a 
ratification of the convention as the only means of preventing the secession of those 
Departments and the attempt to constitute of their territories an independent republic. 

As early as the 7th of May, therefore, the representatives of Panama 
were giving it to be understood at Bogota that if the treaty were not 
ratified it would lead to the secession of the State which they 
represented. 

On page 22, June 10, Mr. Beaupre says: 

Mr. Mancini, the local agent of the Panama Canal Company, has informed me that 
-he had received an official note from the Colombian Government, stating that it did 
did not think the convention would be ratified because of the opinion that the com- 
pensation was insufficient, but that if the canal company would pay to Colombia 
about $10,000,000 ratification could be secured. Mr. Mancini has notified his 
company of this note. 

Then they were trying, as was obvious, to squeeze the company. 
They sent to the agent of the French company and said they wanted 
ten millions from them. 

On page 26, June 20, at 5 p. m., when the extra session had con- 
vened, Mr. Beaupre telegraphed: 

Extra session of Congress convened to-day. Joaquin Velez, president of the Senate ; 
Jose" Medina Calderon, president of the Chamber of Representatives. The President's 
message deals with canal convention as follows: "To my Government has been pre- 
sented this dilemma: either it lets our soA^ereignty suffer detriment or renounces 
certain pecuniary advantages, to which, according to the opinion of many, we have 
a right. In the first case to consent to the sacrifice of our sovereignty and not aspiring 
to great indemnification, the just wishes of the inhabitants of Panama and other 
Colombians would be satisfied if the canal were opened, but the Government would 
be exposed to the charge afterwards that it did not defend our sovereignty and that 
it did not defend the interests of the nation. 

That is, the President, who had caused the treaty to be made, sends 
in a message in which he vibrates between the two propositions, that 
there is doubt about their right to cede territory, and, on the other 



PANAMA. 27 

Tiand, that there are great pecuniary advantages; and he transmits 
this treaty which he had caused to be made, with that shuffling mes- 
sage, to the Congress called to consider it. 
Mr. Beaupre says on June 20 : 

As I have heretofore predicted, there is a full and ample majority of the friends of 
the Government in both houses of Congress, and such legislation as the Government 
may seriously desire will be enacted. 

The Government itself, which had made the treaty and had the 
power then, Mr. Beaupre says, to have passed it, subsequently had 
excited so much feeling against it and against themselves that all 
action became hopeless. But at that time they had the power, and 
the Government that had made the treaty was holding back in the 
hopes of getting more money out of us or more money out of the canal 
•company. Their constitutional scruples, which now play so large 
a part, were then only used for purposes of blackmail, and would 
Jiave disappeared at once before the offer of a few extra millions. It 
is altogether a pretty picture of a responsible government supposed 
to be fit to maintain international relations. 

June 27 our minister says again : 

Friends of the Government have control in Congress. I believe any legislation 
seriously desired by the Government will pass. 

That was brought to a test. He telegraphed on the 25th: 

Opposition Chamber of Representatives opened canal discussion yesterday, demand- 
ing documents relating to the treaty. The Government objected because it was not 
ready to present the treaty. The Government was sustained; vote 38 to 5. 

That shows the control which the Government had at that time. 

Now, again, I come to a passage which will throw light on the 
question which the Senator from Virginia has asked me. Mr. Beau- 
pre writes on July 5, and, after acknowledging the receipt of a cipher 
telegram, says: 

This and the statement of just-arrived members of Congress from Panama that this 
Department would revolt if the treaty is not ratified caused alarm, and the effect is 
favorable. 

He means favorable, of course, to the ratification of the treaty. 

Again, he writes on the 9th of July that he has been asked by a 
gentleman, evidently of importance, whose name is not given, if the 
payment can not be increased to $15,000,000. He says on July 11: 

The majority in the Senate are opposed to treaty. Apparently the Government— 

The Government that made it — 

is not defending the treaty, although it may intend to later. 

He further says on July 1 1 : 

Ex-President Caro has been the leader of the opposition in this debate and has 
made many brilliant speeches. He has charged the Government with lack of good 
faith and consistency, both to the United States and Colombia, in not defending a 
treaty of its own making and for endeavoring to throw the whole responsibility upon 
Congress. 

Thus we learn that the opposition had pictured this attitude, this 
discreditable attitude, of the Government which had made the treaty, 
which would not take responsibility for it, which would not carry it 
through, although it had the majority, but was holding back evidently 



28 • PANAMA. 

with the hope of getting more money out of somebody. That was 
openly charged in the debate. Our minister says again: 

The Vice President — 

That is, Marroquin, who was acting as President and who had 
caused the treaty to be made — 

has positively declined to sign, and if the motion aspresented should prevail and he 
still refuses his signature, the Senate will not consider the treaty at all, and in all 
probability Congress will be dissolved. 

On the 21st of July he says: 

The Government has continued to triumph on every important question. 

Now I come to a passage to which I ask the careful attention of the 
Senate, inasmuch as we are considering the good faith of the people 
with whom we had these dealings and what sort of treatment they 
are entitled to from us. Mr. Beaupre, July 21, said: 

I have certain, but private, information that Dr. Uricoechea, a member of the 
special Senate committee heretofore referred to, and who lived a great many years in 
Germany, called on Baron Grunau, the German charge d'affaires, to inquire what 
would be the attitude of the German Government in case of trouble arising out of the 
matter, and whether it would be willing to undertake or aid the construction of the 
canal in case the treaty with the United States should not be ratified. Baron Griinau 
replied that he had no instructions bearing upon the subject, but that he was of the 
positive opinion that, considering how desirous his Government was at the present 
moment to remain on friendly terms with the United States, it would not take any 
steps with reference to the construction of the canal or to any controversy growing out 
of the present negotiations; that he would, however, submit the matter to his Govern- 
ment. 

My English colleague, with whom I have the most pleasant personal relations, and 
whose attitude I know has been one of unswerving friendliness to our interests in this 
matter, informs me — ■ 

This is direct — 

that one of the deputies of the Chamber of Representatives called on bim with an 
inquiry similar to the one above mentioned. To this he replied that this question 
was thoroughly considered by His Majesty's Government at the time the modifica- 
tions were made in the Bulwer-Clayton treaty, and that his Government was of the 
opinion that the safeguards contained in the Hay-Pauncefote arrangement formed a 
sufficient guaranty for the commerce of the world, and was therefore willing now to 
leave the United States quite free as regards any further negotiations with reference 
to the construction of a canal . 

There they were, Mr. President, members of the House and the 
Senate of Colombia, seeking to make arrangements with Germany or 
England, trying to discover if Germany or England was ready to 
make arrangements to build that canal in case they rejected the 
treaty with us, and these are people whose very existence depends 
upon the maintenance of the Monroe doctrine which we uphold, who 
are defended by the shield we throw over them. At that very mo- 
ment, with our treaty pending, these honest patriots were sneaking 
up to two of the great powers of Europe, fortunately our friends, 
fortunately awake to the situation and its conditions, and inviting 
them to come into the American hemisphere and build the canal. 
Those are the people who would now ask consideration at our hands. 

Mr. President, I do not know that it is necessary for me to follow 
out the history of the amendments which were proposed in the 
Colombian Congress. They all ended practically in a demand by these 



PANAMA. 29 

patriots for more money. But on August 12 the Senate rejected the 
treaty, and Mr. Beaupre says: 

Referring to my telegram of August 12, 7 p. m., I do not believe that rejection of 
treaty is final , for the following reasons: Yesterday's debate and vote was undoubtedly 
previously arranged . 

In other words, it was a step — a trick, if you please — to try to ex- 
tort further concessions from us. 

I come now to another passage which again throws light on the 
question asked by the Senator from Virginia. Mr. Beaupre says that 
there is nobody supporting the treaty; that its support has failed; 
that the Government has retreated from its position and hostility to 
the Government is growing. Then he adds : 

Even the Panama representatives have lately become so thoroughly imbued with 
the idea of an independent republic that they have been more or less indifferent to the 
fate of the treaty. 

On September 5 he wrote that the committee had reported a law 
by which they authorized the President to open new negotiations, in 
which they were to ask for an increase all around of rental and 
$20,000,000 from the United States. 

On September 10 he speaks of the appointment of Obaldia as 
governor of Panama, and says: 

Fierce attack to-day in the Senate upon the appointment of Obaldia as governor 
of Panama. The appointment is regarded as being the forerunner of separation. 

Obaldia was supposed to be very friendly to Panama. 

Of several senators who spoke, only the son of the President defended the action of 
the Government. 

Resolution passed by almost unanimous vote, which is equivalent to vote of censure 
against the Government. 

That censure upon the Government was for appointing a man 
whom they thought friendly to the separatist movement in Panama. 
Again he says, on the 11th of September: 

Sir: I have the honor to report that events of interest have taken place in connec- 
tion with the appointment- of Senator Obaldia to the post of governor of the Depart- 
ment of Panama. 

Senator Obaldia s separatist tendencies are well known, and he is reported to have 
said that, should the canal treaty not pass, the Department of Panama would declare 
its independence, and would be right in doing so. 

That was a senator speaking at Bogota; and yet people hold up 
their hands and say the revolution in Panama was a surprise. 

At yesterday's session of the Senate the feeling of opposition to Senor Obaldia '■B ap- 
pointment was given expression by a resolution proposed by Senator Perez y Soto, to 
the effect that— . 

"The Senate of the Republic can not see with indifference the appointment whicn 
has been made for the post of governor of the Department of Panama, which it regards 
as a menace to the safety of the Republic. " 

That shows that the matter was thoroughly under discussion at 
that time. 

On the 30th of September our minister writes : 

It is said, and generally believed in this city, that there is a project on foot among 
certain senators to annul the arrangement entered into by the Colombian Government 
and the French Canal Co. in 1900, extending the franchise and privileges of that 
company. 



30 PANAMA. 

Now, Mr. President, I think the extracts which I have read show 
the manner in which the Congress of Colombia dealt with this treaty, 
made at their solicitation and carrying not only the concessions they 
wanted, but also a great sum of money for the benefit of their people. 
I think it is a pretty sorry picture, this description of the manner in 
which our treaty was dealt with at Bogota. Their actions resemble 
those of irrational highwaymen much more than responsible public 
men of even indifferent honesty. 

It also comes out from this correspondence that back in May, be- 
fore the Congress met, there was already talk in Bogota of a revolution 
and of the secession of Panama; that it was openly spoken of by the 
representatives of Panama when they arrived; and that later they 
became so imbued with the idea of independence that they were 
indifferent to the fate of the treaty, because they preferred to seek 
their own independence. 

All these facts were matters of notoriety in the Colombian capital. 
The Colombian President and Congress did not conceal their attempt 
to extort more money, and they did not hesitate to make approaches 
to the representatives of European nations to see whether they could 
make a bargain with them. If those performances, Mr. President, 
constitute the serious acts of a serious and honorable government, 
or of a government acting in good faith, then I am very much mis- 
taken in my judgment of what constitutes honor and good faith in 
governmental action. 

Mr. President, I desire to call attention now to the feelings and the 
attitude of Panama. I want to show to the Senate that the revolu- 
tion, about which Senators speak as if it were the creation of a moment, 
represents not only the preparations of months, but that it expresses 
the feelings and the hostilities of years. I am going to read from a 
speech made by the Senator from Alabama [Mr. Morgan] on the 
20th of December, 1902. I could not hope myself to put in better or 
in such eloquent language the feelings of the people of Panama 
toward the Government of Colombia. The Senator then said: 

They remember what the people of Panama can never forget — that their State, 
once sovereign and independent, was the first State of this hemisphere, after the 
United States of North America, that achieved their independence and sovereignty. 

Neither can they forget that the church party has stripped that badge of honor 
and power from their national flag and has reduced Panama to a department of Colom- 
bia, ruled by a governor appointed at Bogota. It is as if Ohio should be reduced to 
the former condition of a part of our Northwestern Territory. Above all, they can not 
forget the degrading bondage of the concordat that the church party in Colombia 
has forced upon them in the agreement of 1888 with Pope Leo XIII. While memory 
of these events lasts in Panama peace will have only a precarious and temporary 
residence there. 

These thoughtful men know that agitation in Panama will be incessant to enlarge 
the canal concession we may obtain from Colombia into a bond of union with the 
United States, and no occasion that promises success will be overlooked to promote 
and intensify that fueling; and they know that even the security of the canal property 
will be made a reason why the United States should accept the annexation of Panama 
as a measure of necessity. This is not a new thought or an abandoned hope in Panama.. 
I dread the thought of placing such a temptation, so lit up with the hopes of restored 
liberty, honor, and sovereignty, before those people, unless they could be again' 
realized in their separate independence. 

If Panama could be again restored to her sovereign independence, I would hail 
the event with joy, but I will not consent to an agreement with Colombia that may 
drive Panama into our Union to escape her present bondage to Colombia. 

Above all else, we should be careful and entirely frank in our dealings with Colombia. 
The belief or the pledge that we will even aid her actively in fastening upon Panama 



PANAMA. 31 

the fetters of the concordat of 1888 or in maintaining her hold on Panama against the 
will of her people, if they choose to throw it off, will prove to be a mistake thai may 
deceive Colombia, for our people will not sustain us in supporting buce a pledge. 

Our people will never aid Colombia in the infliction of wrong and injustice upon 
the people of Panama at the will and pleasure of that Governmeni, and bhie appears 
to be the pledge we are asked to give. They will never extinguish or prevenl the 
rekindling of the light of liberty, independence, and sovereignty in thai once bril- 
liant star that has been stricken from the galaxy of American republics by the frat- 
ricidal hand of Colombia. A casual concession offers no temptation to the people of 
the United States for an act that is so unnatural. 

It would be a far better use to make of the $40,000,000 we are asked to pay the Pana- 
ma Canal Co. for a title that is a mere possession of a property I hey arc anxious to get 
rid of to pay $30,000,000 of it to Colombia for the restoration of Panama to independence 
and $10,000,000 to Panama for the concessions claimed by the New Panama (anal 
Co. The French could then work out their concession, if they wish to do so, and if 
they can get the money, or, if not, they could forfeit it to the United Mates. 

* -x- * * * * * 

When the trea.ty of 1846-1848 was made Panama was a State with sovereign powers. 
Now she is a department of Colombia, and that treaty has made the Tinted States 
accessory to her degradation. I can never vote for its renewal. To pledge the pro- 
tection of Colombia in her sovereignty over one of her departments, without restric- 
tion as to any abuses of power over those people, is to bind our country to assist Colom- 
bia in any policy she may choose to adopt toward them. It is not a pledge of pro- 
tection to Colombia against foreign aggression, but a pledge of assistance to that Govern- 
ment against any resistance by the people of Panama to any policy or law Colombia 
may choose to impose upon a people who are already degraded in their political rights 
from the proud position of sovereign statehood to that of a mere department that is 
governed from Bogota. 

Mr. Morgan. Mr. President 



The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Massachu- 
setts yield ? 

Mr. Lodge. Certainly; with pleasure. 

Mr. Morgan. I have no word in that statement to change — no 
sentiment, no thought, no word. I have not changed it, and I do 
not propose to change it. 

Now, may I ask the honorable Senator from Massachusetts, did 
he not vote to put back on Panama those very bonds against which 
I was declaiming? 

Mr. Lodge. I voted for the treaty with Colombia. 

Mr. Morgan. Did it not do that very thing? 

Mr. Lodge. I did not think so. 

Mr. Morgan. Was it not an exact repetition of the treaty of 1846, 
word for word, with an addition applying it particularly to certain 
special localities in Panama? So the Senator reads that for the 
purpose of reproaching me, I suppose, for a change of opinion — an 
opinion that I have not changed in the slightest degree. 

I will ask the Senator again, is he now willing to take that $40,000,- 
000 that these condemned felons in France are to get from us and 
pay Colombia for Panama ? 

Mr. Lodge. No, Mr. President; I am not willing that the United 
States should break any agreement it has made. 

Mr. Morgan. The United States has no agreement to-day with 
the Panama Canal Co., so that we are as free as the wind with 
respect to an agreement. Now, is the Senator, in the absence of any 
agreement with Panama, willing to pay Colombia that $40,000,000 
which we propose to pay to the Panama Canal Co. and buy the 
peace of Colombia toward the United States and toward Panama? 



32 PANAMA. 

Mr. Lodge. I am not willing to take money which I honestly 
think should be paid to the Panama Canal Co. for its property 
rights there and give it to anybody else. 

Mr. Morgan. I understand it all now. I am glad I got the reply. 

Mr. Lodge. I did not read that quotation for the purpose of 
charging the Senator either with consistency or with inconsistency. 
I do not think that matters of consistency or inconsistency — "the 
bugbear of weak minds" — are of much importance or consequence. 
I read it because it was an extremely strong statement of the feel- 
ings of the people of Panama, showing that those feelings were the 
growth of years and because it alluded to Panama's constitutional 
relations with Colombia, which I now wish to touch upon. 

In 1819 Colombia was included under the constitution of Bolivar, 
and had all the territory now occupied by Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela. 

In 1830 Colombia separated into New Granada, Venezuela, and 
Ecuador, and the constitution of 1832 was formed. That was the 
constitution of New Granada. 

There was a new constitution of New Granada in 1843. Article 
232 of that constitution makes secession an act of rebellion, and it 
was due to the revolt of certain provinces, including Panama, in 
1840. This was amended by Congress in 1855 by a law making 
Panama a Federal State, sovereign in itself, and dependent on the 
Government of New Granada only on certain points. Other States 
followed, and New Granada became practically a federated republic. 
This resulted in the constitution of 1858, which recognized the 
sovereignty of the several States, and the name was changed to the 
Granadine Confederation. That is the last constitution to which 
Panama ever gave its assent. 

Then followed a liberal revolution in 1860 against the election laws, 
which _was conducted under Gen. Mosquera and based upon the 
sovereignty of the States. There was then a pact made at Cartagena 
to form the United States of Granada, and in 1861 the name was 
changed to United States of Colombia by the further pact of Bogota. 
In 1862 the liberal revolution was completely victorious, and in 1863 
a new constitution was made by the "plenipotentiaries of the States," 
as they were called. Article 93 of that constitution provided that this 
constitution should take effect only on unanimous ratification of 
State deputations, and if any State refused to ratify it should not 
be binding. The result was an "organized anarchy," and the 
constitution which was imposed simply by the party victorious in 
war and never had any complete assent was followed by constant 
revolts and insurrections, especially on the Isthmus. 

In 1884 Rafael Nunez seized the Government as a dictator and 
suspended the constitution of 1863. He had delegates from the 
nine States called to council, and in 1885 the council passed a resolu- 
tion for a convention to frame a new constitution subject to the 
ratification of the people of the State. In 1886 the new constitution 
was adopted annulling the constitution of 1863. It was the exact 
reverse of the constitution of 1863 and centralized power entirely. 
It took away the autonomy of the States, and was never submitted 
to the popular vote. The constitution of 1886 has been suspended 
and inoperative since 1900. The last constitution accepted by 



PANAMA. 33 

Panama was in 1858. When her constitutional relations are con- 
sidered, I think it is well to bear that little bit of constitutional 
history in mind. 

Mr. Morgan. Mr. President 

The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Massachusetts 
yield? 

Mr. Lodge. With pleasure. 

Mr. Morgan. If the Senator will allow me a question, does he 
think that the constitutional duty of Panama is any less toward 
Colombia than it was when she was a free, sovereign, and inde- 
pendent State, after she had been denationalized, broken down as a 
State, and reduced to a department? 

Mr. Lodge. As a matter of constitutional law, I do not think it 
makes a particle of difference in considering this question, for I 
consider under any constitution her separation from Colombia as 
an act of revolution. I merely put that statement in in order to show 
what her actual constitutional position was, as I understand it. 

Mr. Morgan. That the Senator's remark was a very painful 
reminder to me of the fact that after the Civil War had closed and 
politicians got hold of the destinies of the country Alabama was 
forced, before she could receive any right of representation on this 
floor, to pass a constitution that renounced her well-cherished and 
well-established doctrine of the right of secession. We gave it up. 
Other States in the Union were not required to do that. The State 
of the Senator from Massachusetts was not required to yield up her 
sovereign right of secession, which she proposed to exercise in the 
year 1812. 

Now, I wish to ask this question of the Senator. Suppose that 
Great Britain, with a view to trying to restore to us in Alabama our 
ancient rights of sovereignty as they existed before our constitution 
was changed on the demand of the Republican Party in the United 
States, should say to Alabama: "We are willing to recognize your 
independence; we acknowledge that you have resumed the sover- 
eignty you had before you passed your act renouncing it," does 
the Senator think that Great Britain by that act of recognition or 
that promise would restore Alabama even to her former prestige 
and right or that she could separate Alabama from the United States 
as a matter of international law ? 

Mr. Lodge. Of course, Mr. President, I do not think that the 
recognition of Great Britain could restore to Alabama or to any 
other State rights which under the Constitution of the United States, 
as I understand it, she never had. I do not want to enter into the 
old discussion of the constitutional right of secession, because to 
my mind it is simply a question of fact, a question of successful or 
unsuccessful revolution. What I wanted to call attention to here 
was merely the fact that, so far as the constitutional question is 
involved at all the last constitution to which Panama gave her assent 
was the constitution of 1858, which assured to her and to every 
State of the Granadine Confederation, as it was then called, the right 
of withdrawal, and guaranteed their autonomy. 

Now, still further, in regard to the treatment of Panama and the 
reason why there was revolution there, I have here a letter which 

S. Doc. 37, 67-1 3 



34 PANAMA. 

appeared in the New York Evening Post of December 17, dated 
Panama, December 8. I shall ask to have it all printed with my 
remarks, because it is extremely interesting, and the New York 
Evening Post is a newspaper which for many years has been so 
absolutely crazed with hostility to the Republican Party or to any 
administration which seemed to be advancing the interests of the 
United States that I am perfectly certain it can not be supposed to 
be a biased witness ; and this is an admission against itself. This 
letter is worth reading, because it shows, I think, on its face why 
those people were ripe for revolution. 
The matter referred to, is as follows : 

[Special correspondence of the Evening Post.] 

Panama, Republic op Panama, December 8. 

Next to that of the Negro republics the most exasperating Government is doubtless 
that which is known as "Latin America." Panama had an experience of it which 
may well be indicated as an excuse for separation. To get to the point, every member 
of the present junta was among the company of 23 Conservatives of Panama called 
together by Gov. Alban a few years ago. 

''Gentlemen," he said, when they assembled in the Yellow Room of the Palacio 
del Gobierno, "the Conservatives need $50,000. I will withdraw while you arrange 
the matter. ' ' 

Retiring, he summoned his soldiers and placed a cordon around the building. 
Government, for much of the time, being actual martial rule, this meant that anyone 
who sought to come out without subscribing his due share, according to his riches, 
would be thrown into prison. Gov. Alban returned to the Yellow Room. He was 
met with protests. 

"There are soldiers all about this house." he replied. "Before you pass through 
them you will subscribe $50,000." Again he withdrew, and when he returned the 
paper had been signed. 

These subscriptions were prettily called "voluntary subscriptions," as recruits for 
the army were tied with ropes, yet called "volunteers." They were rather worse, 
as "business." than corporation contributions to Tammany Hall, because there came 
in return for them no adequate advantages, moral or immoral. Sometimes if one of 
the eventual contributors was obstinate, he was made to take chili sauce and salt 
water. The suffering from this is so shocking, one is assured, that "when the man 
recovered he was fit for treason." At any rate he was in a receptive mood for sugges- 
tions of secession and only bided his time. 

"voluntary subscriptions." 

Hermadio Arosemena, of the banking house of that name, suffered frequently from 
the "voluntary subscription," for all the Arosemenas were known to be Liberals. 
One day a notice was posted on his door saying that before a certain hour of a certain 
day he must pay $25,000. He had it reported that he was out of town — that he had 
gone to Ecuador. Troops were quartered in his house. "Cable him for the money," 
the governor recommended to the family. Arosemena was not in Ecuador, but hiding 
in his own home. But he would not allow the money to be paid. For nine months 
he was a prisoner there, never stepping beyond his threshold. Besides, the soldiers 
on guard during that period had to be fed from his own larder. That was the practice. 
At different times, not reckoning the billeting of troops, the Arosemenas paid within 
a few years more than $150,000 in "voluntary subscriptions" to Colombian governors. 

Oscar Miiller, a jeweler, shows receipts for "war loans" of $50 to $100 a month. He 
was born on the Isthmus. Though of German parents, he had no protection. One 
day he was asked for a "voluntary subscription" of $1,250. He removed everything 
from-his safe and refused to pay. A commission came from Gen. Alban to iorce the 
safe. Miiller gave the combination rather than see the safe blown up. Nothing but 
old papers were found in it. "Lock his house and let no one in or out," ordered 
Alban. For 24 hours Miiller's family were thus besieged. Then Miiller compromised 
for $300. He had to pay $1 additional for the man who had come to blow up the safe. 
The man did not need to do the job, but he had "lost his time." Miiller had also to 
pay $6 for the advertisement of the intended sale of his store. Your correspondent 
has seen all these receipts and the witnesses. 



PANAMA. 35 

Carlos Muller, brother to 03car, was similarly treated. Hi3 haberdashery was 
locked up for four days, till he should subscribe $1,250. Advertisement of a public 
sale of his goods was made, and then he yielded. At the house of Domingo Diaz the 
soldiers occupied the bedroom of Sefiora Diaz, and the women folk had for two nights 
no place to sleep. They could not leave the house.' Merchants were assessed $7.50 
a day for the colonel's horse when the colonel was on duty in town. The imposition 
was that several merchants would each be assessed for the same $7.50. They always 
paid rather than go to jail. Out at the barracks an Italian egg peddler was asked to 
leave two additional eggs for two that had been found not good. When he refused, he 
was taken by soldiers and given 500 lashes on his bare back. 

ASSESSMENTS FOR INDIFFERENCE. 

Federico Boyd was held up for $10,000, but settled for $5,000. Espriella ran away 
to Costa Rica — he had only just returned — to avoid a '"voluntary subscription." 
which he heard was to be required of him. Ycaza, before he could escape, was levied 
upon for $5,000. It did not make any difference, if the governor wanted money, 
whether a man was of his own party or not. The 23 whom he imprisoned in the 
Yellow Room were Conservatives, like himself. If a man were neither Liberal nor 
Conservative, he was still liable to assessment. J. G. Duque, who holds the lottery 
privilege, had a clerk at Colon. F. Cortez, who was a Colombian, but took no part or 
interest in politics. He was assessed $800 for being an indifferente. "The gov- 
ernor gave me that explanation himself," Mr. Duque says. Soon after the clerk was 
assessed $100. "I had just lent the Government some money without charging inter- 
est," Mr. Duque tells me. "I went to Alban and declared that if he did not leave my 
■clerk alone I would charge interest. At that he erased the assessment." 

Officers would select saddles and swords and not pay for them. The cost would 
lie as a charge against some designated citizen or allowed to go to the loss column of 
the merchant's daybook. If one man loaned money to another, it sometimes happened 
that the borrower would be sent for and compelled to hand over the borrowed money 
to the Government. The lender would have to stand the loss, as the papers would be 
canceled. 

Importers for a while were assessed arbitrary sums instead of an import tax. Banks 
were forced to make loans. Government, indeed, was a kind of piracy, of buccaneer- 
ing almost as barbaric as that which Henry Morgan carried on along these coasts, with 
headquarters at Bogota instead of at Porto Bello. Indirectly foreigners were affected 
by the methods. Mr. Duque, for example, who is a Cuban-American, saw all his 
cattle at Chiriqui driven away by foragers for a marching army. He could get no one 
to testify to it (and so could not collect damages), "for witnesses would be flogged if 
they gave such evidence." Soldiers turned his country house into a barracks, "and 
I, myself," he relates, " saw them and their women bringing my f urniture to town, 
piece by piece, to sell it at the pawnshops." One hears of several foreigners who lost 
inone}' because " voluntary subscriptions" left them unable to pay their just debts 

RAISING THE COST OF LIVING. 

Monopolies were granted in ice, tobacco, salt, pearl fishing, lotteries, gambling, 
butchering. Ice, which is a necessity of life in this climate, was 25 cents a pound. A 
farmer could not kill his own cattle for market without paying $10 a head to the con- 
cessionaire. Swine had to yield $4 a head. Salt the Government bought from the 
concessionaire at $1.50 a hundredweight and sold it to the people at $4. Nobody 
could sell tobacco except Isaac Brandon & Bro. Nobody could wholesale cigarettes 
except Piza Piza. The prices were "all the traffic would bear." If the people were 
squeezed too much, they bought less. So it was more profitable not to kite rates too 
high. The ice monopoly paid the Government $1,000 a month for a while, and the 
price of ice to the consumer was 10 cents a pound. Then Bogota raised the rental to 
$2,000 and permitted the concessionaire to charge the consumer 25 cents a pound. On 
this basis the concessionaire lost money. The sale of ice decreased, and at last he 
could not pay the rent of his monopoly, and Mr. Duque was appointed to run the 
business for the Government itself, reducing the price to "what the traffic would bear." 

GOV. ALBAN. 

Alban seems to have been the most oppressive of the military governors. Yet there 
was a quality in him which now and then touched the hearts of the people. He was 
exceedingly brave, and was killed at last in a naval battle in Panama Bay, and he 
lies at the bottom with his ship. 



36 PANAMA. 

Two sisters came to him to seek the release of their brother from prison. 

"Bring me $400," he answered them, "and he can go free." 

The girls sold all their jewelry, but could raise only $300. "I must have the full 
$400," he insisted. The girls borrowed the other $100 of a usurer, and returned with, 
the money. 

"Ah, I thought you could get it," he remarked. "How did you do it?" 

They showed him the receipts for the jewelry; they showed him the contract with 
the usurer. 

"What," he exclaimed, "10 per cent a month?" He sent at once for the usurer. 

"You took the jewels of these girls, giving them only $300, and then you charge' 
them 10 per cent a month on the other $100? Bring those jewels to me. Bring also 
their contract to pay." When the usurer came back Alban gave the jewels to the sis- 
ters, tore up the papers, sent the money lender back to his pawnshop, wrote out a fulL 
pardon for the brother of the girls, and kept the $400 as punishment to the usurer. 

OTHER EFFORTS AT SEPARATION. 

Natives make out that the revolutionary or separatist spirit has been long years- 
growing; 70 years ago, when the Isthmus cut loose from Spain it spontaneously joined 
Colombia. 

"That country acquired it free of expense, without the cost of a penny or a life," 
as one of them puts it, "but she did not properly value it, for only misrule and oppres- 
sion followed. The Isthmus was used merely as a soui'ce of revenue. Pondering this,, 
our people grew resentful. Several attempts to separate from Colombia were made.. 
One of Bolivar's soldiers, Gen. Espinar, headed a revolution in 1830, and he set up a. 
free State, but by reason of sweet words the Isthmus soon went back to Colombia. 
The sweet words meant nothing. Old practices were reverted to. Remonstrances, 
were of no avail; inland politicians treated us more like serfs than brothers. 

"In 1840 there was a revolution which gave another opportunity of breaking away. 
Under Col. Herrera independence was once again proclaimed. It was short-lived. 

"In 1855 Panama was permitted to be governed by its own special laws, and there- 
appeared to be an era of satisfaction ahead, when Gen. Masqu era rose up, overthrew 
the Government at Bogota, became dictator, and sent Murillo Toro to Panama to- 
attach it to his cause. A fair treaty was entered into with him; but the dictator repu- 
diated his work and sent down an army to compel adhesion unconditionally. Panama, 
became as a conquered land and was treated accordingly. Her governor was replaced, 
by one of the dictator's creatures. 

HIGHER EXPENSES IMPOSED. 

"Daring the three years' war, which ended one year ago, we were subjected to num- 
berless oppressions, heavily taxed, and charged enormously for the necessaries of life. 
That has taught us several things about Colombia and aboat ourselves. It taught us,, 
for one thing, the extent of our own resources, and we began to think once more of 
separation. We looked upon the building of the canal as a matter of life or death to- 
ils. We wanted that because it meant, with the United States in control of it, peace 
and prosperity for us. President Marroquin appointed an isthmian to be governor of 
Panama; and we looked upon that as of happy augury. 

"Soon we heard that the canal treaty was not likely to be approved at Bogota. 
Next we heard that our isthmian governor, Obaldia, who had scarcely assumed power,, 
was to be superseded by a soldier from Bogota. We thought that the days of misrule 
were upon us once more. We decided to strike a blow for freedom. General Huertas, 
in command of the troops here, gladly joined us. General Tovar was coming to take 
his place. General Pompillio was coming to take the place of Obaldia. Tovar was, 
to receive from Panamans $1,200, whereas Huertas had been getting only $400. Pom- 
pillio was to have a salary of $2,000, although Obaldia 's had been only $800. This 
was penalty imposed because Bogota had heard that Panama had thoughts of dis- 
loyalty and independence. 

' ' Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained us of in the way of revenues, she did. 
not bridge for us a single river, nor make a single roadway, nor erect a single college 
where our children could be educated, nor do anything at all to advance our indus- 
tries. * * * Well, when the new generals came, we seized them, arrested them, 
and the town of Panama was in a joy. Not a protest was made, except the shots 
fired from the Colombian gunboat Bogota, which killed one Chinese lying in his bed. 
We were willing to encounter the Colombian troops at Colon and fight it out, but the 
commander of the United States cruiser Nashville forbade Superintendent Shaler to. 
allow the railway to transport troops for either party. That is our story." 



PANAMA. 37 

LITTLE OPPOSITION. 

Panama evades much, gains more, and loses nothing at all in achieving separation 
•with American bayonets to maintain it. She will get $10,000,000 for canal rights; 
will have her two main towns cleaned by the United States, and will derive obvious 
■and tremendous benefits from the incoming of the thousands of canal workmen. 

Her material advantages are so clear that it is natural that opposition to her new 
direction should be difficult to find. The church, of course, will have to readjust 
its manner of support, as it did in Cuba and the Philippines; but Saturday's out- 
break in the barracks was of no account as a sign of opposition. 

If the Spanish method of doing things was not still unconsciously influential with 
the provisional government, there would have been no deportation of soldiers, for 
the evidence on which, without a hearing, they were adjudged guilty of conspiring 
to kill the commanding general, Huertas, was very flimsy and the action somewhat 
hysterical. 

Two letters were written from Port Limon, one to Huertas telling him he'd better 
xead one which was coming to Col. Ferral. He intercepted the one addressed to 
Col. Ferral. It seemed to hint that an attempt to recapture the garrison for Colombia, 
and forthwith he arrested everybody mentioned in the Ferral letter, ran them at point 
of bayonet aboard a train for Colon to be taken out of the country. 

"I shall be landed on the beach at Port Limon, ' ' remarked Col. Lorano, good humor- 
edly, "with only $2 silver in my pocket. I am sorry now I took the trouble to pay 
all my bills before leaving Panama. ' ' 

He protests that he would like to stay in the new Republic. "Why should I plot 
•against it? I signed allegiance to it with the rest, and thereby sacrificed connection 
"with Colombia. If I should go to Colombia, I'd be shot for treason." F. C. 

Mr. Lodge. That, I think, is pretty good testimony as to the 
conditions down there in Panama. 

Now I come to the question of the incidents which led up imme- 
diately to the recognition of Panama by the United States. I will 
first show how they knew of it in Bogota. Mr. Beaupre, on the 21st 
of October, wrote: 

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that there is no disguising the alarm existing 
as to the possible action of the Government of the United States should the feeling of 
disaffection undoubtedly existing in the Department of Panama find expression in 
overt acts. This alarm took the form of a heated debate in the Senate yesterday, 
when the Government was again attacked for the appointment of Sehor Obaldia as 
governor of Panama. 

On October 29 he telegraphed: 

October 29, 1 p. m. Please give instructions to consul general at Panama. Keep 
me advised by cable matters of consequence. 

At that time it was so well known in Bogota what was impending 
that he thought it important he should be in immediate communi- 
cation with the consul general. 

It will be noticed that on October 29 Mr. Beaupre in Bogota 
thought the revolution was impending and on the 31st he says: 

The people here in great anxiety over conflicting reports of secession movements 
in the Cauca and Panama. 

In other words, on the 31st of October people in Bogota had 
reports that revolution had actually broken out, and on November 
18 he heard from our Government the action that we had taken. 

Now, that is what was known in Colombia. The talk had begun 
in Bogota as early as May about a probable revolution in Panama. 
It was the common talk of the city. It was openly spoken of by the 
representatives of Panama in the Congress. It was openly discussed 
■everywhere days before it occurred. So expected was it that there 
were rumors in Bogota that it had occurred before November 3. All 
the world knew last summer that there was revolution impending. 



38 PANAMA. 

The correspondent of the New York Evening Post for December 8 
says that they were planning revolution in Panama early in May. I 
happened to be out of the country, seeing only foreign newspapers 
in London and elsewhere, but it was a matter of common knowledge 
both in Europe and in England, that revolution was impending in 
Panama if the treaty was not agreed to. 

That knowledge, of course, came to the Executive, tie had in- 
formation also from our naval and military officers, which has been 
cited in his message. It was his business to keep informed, but the 
fact of information does not imply assurances or connivance, and the 
insinuations of connivance and incitement have already been denied 
in a manner which requires neither repetition nor support from me 
or anyone else. Those insinuations have been spread abroad for 
political purposes and by persons outside the capital for much more 
discreditable objects. The President would have been in the highest 
degree censurable if he had not taken every proper precaution to 
prepare for the event which the reports of the disturbance on the 
Isthmus suggested. He was bound to carry out the provisions of 
the treaty of 1846. We have alwa3^s construed that treaty to mean 
that we were charged with the responsibility of keeping open the 
transit across the Isthmus; that we were not charged with the duty 
of enforcing the power of Colombia if there was a revolt; that we 
were there to protect it against foreign aggression, but that our 
primary duty was to keep it open and uninterrupted. 

All this information had come in upon the President, and he had 
as in duty bound considered it and watched events. Finally there 
came what constitutes the first act of our Government. News- 
arrived that Colombia was about to land a force of 6,000 men at 
Colon, and the Acting Secretary of the Navy on November 2 sent 
this dispatch: 

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed 
force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile 
intent either Government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other point.. 
Send copy of instructions to the senior officer present at Panama upon arrival of 
Boston. Have sent copy of instructions and have telegraphed Dixie to proceed 
with all possible dispatch from Kingston to Colon. Government force reported 
approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing if in your judgment 
this would precipitate a conflict. Acknowledgment is required. 

That was the first step. The next day, November 3, a press, 
bulletin having announced an outbreak on the Isthmus, the Acting 
Secretary of State telegraphed to the consul at Panama: 

Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep department promptly and fully informed. 

The reply came back that there was no uprising; that it was- 
expected that night. Within a short time, a little more than an 
hour, came the dispatch: 

Uprising occurred to-night. 6; no bloodshed, etc. 

The rest of the story is fully set forth in the dispatches from the 
State and Navy Departments which the President has transmitted 
to Congress. 

Mr. President, the preparations that have been very largely 
talked about, and which I have no doubt were adequately made, 
really resulted in the presence of one vessel of war at Colon. We 
landed from that vessel 42 sailors and marines. The landing party 



PANAMA. 39 

was commanded with judgment. The captain of the Nashville 
showed the utmost discretion and firmness. He prevented with an 
even hand either party from using the railroad. He prevented 
bloodshed. He kept peace on the Isthmus. Mr. President, the 
President of the United States has been assailed for landing troops. 
He has landed no troops. Some sailors and some marines have 
been landed, and he has been charged with having made war 
by the act of recognition and by the landing of the forces of the 
United States. 

It is perfectly certain, Mr. President, that the act of recognition 
by all the best authorities is held not to be in itself an act of war. 
As for the landing of those sailors and marines to keep order, we have 
done it over and over again. We did it in 1900; we did it in 1901; 
we did it in 1902. The dispatches of 1901 and 1900 were read in 
the President's message here yesterday. The admiral there at that 
time telegraphed to the department that he had only allowed the 
troops to go without their arms and under our naval guard, and that 
he had allowed the arms to go by freight train — a separate train, 
also under guard. Colombia has asked us to keep that line of 
transit open over and over again. She asked us to do it on 
this very occasion. Under the treaty of 1846 the President had 
no choice except to maintain order and peace across that line of 
transit, and yet he is charged with having made war. ■ 

Well, Mr. President, if he did make war by that act he had a 
good Democratic precedent for an Executive making war. Mr. 
Webster said in a speech in Faneuil Hall, and I use his words be- 
cause they are particularly good: 

The Mexican War is universallv odious throughout the United States, and we 
have yet to find any Sempronius who raises his voice for it. 

Some one in the gallery asked who voted for the war, and Mr. 
Webster replied, ''Nobody at all; the President made it without 
any vote whatever." 

That is good Democratic precedent if it is held that wai has been 
made by the Executive authority; but, Mr. President, there is no 
need of citing President Polk's action or that of anybody else. 
There has been no war on the Isthmus, and the result of our landing 
troops is that, instead of that Isthmus being drenched in blood by 
contending factions, there is absolute peace. There has been no 
life lost except that of the unfortunate and inevitable Chinaman, 
who was killed in his bed by a shell from a Colombian gunboat. 
I think it is a good thing to have stopped the fighting there, even 
if nothing else was effected. 

We have seen, therefore, that the President, in common with all 
the rest of the world, knew a revolution was impending. He had 
certain duties to perform; he made reasonable preparations, if 
anything too inadequate, for what he anticipated. When the 
revolution came he prevented fighting and kept the transit open. 
I think that was a wise and proper step to take, one which it was 
his plain duty, even if he had not desired, to do so. 

Tne matter of recognition followed quickly, because it was an 
occasion in which it was in the interest ot, the United States as 
the recognizing Government to act quickly. I think myself, Mr. 
President, that the President of the United' States would have been 



40 PANAMA. 

in the highest degree blameworthy if he had not taken precautions 
and if he had not protected the transit across that Isthmus. Our 
naval forces there prevented those people from getting at each 
other's throats. They held back one as much as the other, and the 
result has been the establishment of that Republic by the people 
of Panama without any serious opposition to it within its own 
borders. 

That we are not alone in so judging the event is shown by the 
list of governments which have recognized the independence of 
Panama, and which I shall ask to have printed with the dates of 
recognition. It is worth while to read them over again, for people 
forget that the world has given full assent to the justice of our action. 

The United States recognized Panama on November 13, then 
France, China, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Russia, 
Sweden and Norway, Belgium, Nicaragua, Peru, Cuba, Great Britain, 
Italy, Japan, Costa Rica, and Switzerland. 

Those recognitions indicate that the rest of the civilized world do 
not think it was a very unreasonable thing for us to have recog- 
nized that new Republic quickly. 1 

Among the multiplicity of objections brought forward to our 
action is the objection that Panama ought to pay a part of the 
debt of Colombia. I should like to know when it became a prin- 
ciple of international law that a seceding State, if it succeeded in 
establishing itself as a separate government, ought to pay any part 
of the debt of the country from which is separated. When we 
separated from England I do not recollect that we took up any por- 
tion of the imperial debt for payment, and I never thought any 
dishonor attached to us because we did not offer to pay our share of 
that debt. When Cuba was freed by our hands we insisted above 
all things that she should not be held liable for a single dollar of the 
Spanish debt, and we would not permit that that separating State 
should be responsible for any part of the debt of the mother country. 

Mr. Spoonee. Will the Senator permit me to make a suggestion on 
that point ? 

The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Massa- 
chusetts yield to the Senator from. Wisconsin ? 

Mr. Lodge. Certainly. 

Mr. Spooner. I wish also to allude to the fact that a part of that 
debt was secured by the hypothecation of Cuban revenue, and still 
we would not permit Cuba to be held liable for it. 

Mr. Lodge. Certainly. As the Senator from Wisconsin has well 
suggested, though the revenues of Cuba were particularly hypothe- 
cated for that debt, though it was made a special Cuban debt, we 
would not permit it to become any part of the obligation of the new 
State. 

1 List of governments which have recognized the independence of Panama, with the dates of recognition. 



United States Nov. 13, 1903 

France Nov. 16, 1903 

China Nov. 26, 1903 

Austria-Huncary Nov. 27, 1903 

Germany Nov. 30, 1903 

Denmark Dee. 3, 1903 

Russia Dec. 6, 1903 

Sweden and Norway Dec. 7, 1903 

Belgium Dec. 9, 1903 



Nicaragua Dec. 15, 1903 

Peru Dec. 19, 1903 

Cuba Dec. 23,1903 

Great Britain Dec. 24, 1903 

Italy Dec. 24, 1903 

Japan Dee. 28, 1903 

Costa Rica Dec. 28, 1903 

Switzerland Dec. 28, 1903 



PANAMA. 41 

Mr. Morgan. Will the Senator from Massachusetts permit me to 
ask him a question ? 

The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Massachusetts 
yield to the Senator from Alabama ? 

Mr. Lodge. Certainly. 

Mr. Morgan. The Senator has read a list of governments which 
have recognized something in Panama. I do not know whether it is 
a government de facto or a government de jure, or whether the 
independence or sovereignty of Panama has been recognized by these 
countries. Does the Senator know? 

Mr. Lodge. I do not understand the Senator's question. 

Mr. Morgan. I say I do not know whether the form of recognition 
by these various governments as to the Government of Panama was 
that it was a de facto, a de jure, or a sovereign and independent 
government. Does the Senator know ? 

Mr. Lodge. Mr. President, it was a recognition of the Government 
as an independent de facto government with whom they could 
transact business — the usual recognition. 

Mr. Morgan. That is independence. , 

Mr. Lodge. I never heard of a recognition with a "reservation. 
Perhaps the Senator has. 

Mr. Morgan. That is a new phrase to me — "an independent de 
facto government." 

Mr. Lodge. The Government was de facto. They recognized it 
as an independent government without any qualifications whatso- 
ever, of course. 

Mr. Morgan. Is the Senator sure of that ? 

Mr. Lodge. I never knew of recognition being accorded with 
qualifications or limitations. 

Mr. Morgan. I was merely inquiring as to the fact. 

Mr. Lodge. I understand it was a complete recognition in every 
case — as complete as ours. 

Mr. Morgan. My understanding has been quite the reverse, and 
therefore I asked the Senator. 

I Now, may I ask the Senator whether any of those governments, 
having recognized whatever they have recognized, have not in effect 
insisted that Panama is obliged under the laws of nations to assume a 
part of the debt of Colombia ? 

Mr. Lodge. I do not understand that any government has insisted 
on it. 

Mr. Morgan. Or was insisting. 

Mr. Lodge. I do not understand that any has insisted. 

Mr. Morgan. Then the newspapers are in error. 

Mr. Lodge. I think that highly probable, though I make that 
statement, of course, with great reservation and great hesitation. 
Undoubtedly the British bondholders and other bondholders have 
been talking about their Colombian bonds, but I do not understand 
that any government has put any qualification on their recognition 
of Panama. 

Mr. Morgan. The Senator never knew a Britisher to joke about 
money, did he ? 

Mr. Lodge. As a matter of fact, in the papers sent in yesterday — — 

Mr. Spooner. The Senator will, of course, see that the recognition 
of the liability of a government and the demand that they agree to 



42 PANAMA. 

pay a part of the debt of the government from which they have- 
separated could not be anything else than a recognition of the former's 
independence. 

Mr. Morgan. And nothing else. 

Mr. Lodge. But, Mr. President, as a matter of fact Panama has 
made an offer, and authorized it through her minister here, and has 
announced her intention and her willingness, as appears in the 
correspondence transmitted yesterday, to assume one-fifteenth of the 
debt — her population being one-fifteenth of the population of Colom- 
bia — and she has also proposed that $8,000,000 of the $10,000,000 
should be held in trust by the United States. Those do not seem 
unreasonable or unfair propositions. 

Mr. Morgan. May I ask the Senator is there any condition an- 
nexed to that proposition requiring that we are to furnish the money ? 

Mr. Lodge. We are to furnish what money? 

Mr. Morgan. To pay the debt she insists she is ready to assume. 

Mr. Lodge. Of course we have to pay the $10,000,000 under the 
treaty. I suppose she means to take part of that $10,000,000 to pay 
her share of the debt. 

Mr. Morgan. I was only thinking it would be a pretty bad debt if 
we did not furnish the money. 

Mr. Lodge. I think it is undoubtedly a very bad debt now so far 
as Colombia is concerned, but I think if Panama undertakes to pay 
it it will be a veiy good debt. 

Mr. President, this question is an American question, and our 
interests in it are very profound indeed. The portion of the country 
which I have the honor to represent in part is far removed from the 
canal, and yet it is of immense interest to the people of New England 
that there should be that quickened communication to the East. 
Deep as our interest is far up there on the Atlantic coast, it is nothing 
to the interest of the people of the Gulf — to the people who are 
selling their cotton as well as their manufactures in the East. Most 
important of all, Mr. President, more important than any commercial 
advantage, is the fact that it makes the coast of the United States 
practically continuous from the Columbia River to the extremest 
boundary of Maine. 

Mr. President, the commercial interests, the interests of our self- 
protection, involved in that canal are of the largest possible kind. 
It seems to me that it gives us a stake in that Isthmus which can not 
be overestimated. We also stand before the world as the nation 
which has taken up this great task of opening communication between 
the Atlantic and the Pacific. The civilized world has committed 
that work to us and has done so gladly. We stand in relation to that 
Isthmus not only for our own interest, but as the trustee of the 
interests of the whole civilized world. The people who live there, 
who own it if any people in the world own it absolutely, are anxious 
that we should go there and build a canal on our own terms. We are 
not taking it from the people who dwell there. They are only too 
anxious to have Us coine. But there are a few people up in the 
mountains and on the great plateaus in the interior, farther removed 
from Panama, so far as actual communication goes, then we are in 
the United States, and they have undertaken to say that Panama 
shall not have that canal; they propose to take from Panama, if 



PANAMA. 43 

they could make a treaty, every dollar that is involved in it — people 
who do not own the territory and whose interests are trivial compared 
to the rest of the world. I do not think, Mr. President, that those 
people have the right to stand across the pathway of the world's 
commerce and say, "Here it shall not come." I think that it is part 
of our duty to do just what we have done. I think we should have 
been false to our duty if we had not done it, and there is nothing 
whatever in all the action of the Colombians, of whom our treatment 
has been more than generous, which should make us repent of any 
act that has there been committed. 

Mr. President, this seems to me — if it can be said truly of any 
question — to be a question that is not one of party. Certainly it is 
a question in which the interests and the hopes of all the people of 
the United States — North and South, Democrat and Republican — 
are alike bound up. I think it is a great achievement, in which we 
should all be proud to take a part. I never in my life, I think, 
questioned the motives of anybody who differed from me, and I do 
not now;- still less should I impugn the patriotism of Senators who 
hold a different view of this question from my own. I only ask from 
them the same belief in my sincerity that I accord to theirs ; but I do 
think that it is fairly open to discuss this question from a political 
standpoint, and I confess the attitude assumed by some portions,. 
at least, of the Democratic Party is very curious and interesting. 

I know well that there are some members of that party here and 
large numbers of that party outside of Washington who are as zealous 
and as eager for the promotion of this canal and the ratification of this 
treaty as any people can possibly be. I know, too, that there are 
others — for I have read debates which have occurred elsewhere — who, 
while they protest their hatred of the sinner, seem perfectly willing 
to embrace the sin. But, Mr. President, there is still another ele- 
ment which seems desirous to make this a party question and to 
extract from it political capital. It seems to me that a stranger 
idea than that never enterecl into the head of man. 

I quite agree with the saying of Disraeli that "the business of an 
opposition is to oppose," but I think that great parliamentary leader, 
when he uttered that epigran, postulated that the opposition should 
be intelligent, for he knew perfectly well that the duty of an opposi- 
tion was to be always ready to take up the government from the 
hands of those who were then administering it, and that nothing 
could so soon prevent the rise of an opposition to power as their 
convincing the electorate that they were not fit to govern. Such 
unfitness is very easily shown by the attitude of an opposition; and 
when a party thinks that there is political capital to be gathered in 
resisting the policy which would begin at once the opening of that 
great canal, I think, Mr. President, if I may be pardoned for saying 
so, that it exhibits a misapprehension which it is hard to fathom. 
I have been reminded by this Democratic opposition on several 
occasions of Dr. Johnson's remark about Thomas Sheridan, the 
father of the great dramatist and orator. He said: "Sherry is dull) 
sir, naturally dull, but he must have taken great pains to arrive at 
his present position. Such an excess of stupidity is not in nature 
sir." [Laughter.] 

Mr. President, think of the proposition of making political capital 
out of a question of this nature. As a Republican I should ask 



44 PANAMA. 

nothing better than to have the Panama Canal made the issue in 
the impending campaign. I think, indeed, that a good deal of 
valuable material has already been given us in that direction, but 
I should be very sorry, as an American, to see the work of building 
the canal delayed, and I believe, Mr. President, that when it is 
thought over seriously by the Democratic Party they will see that 
there are more judicious courses than to oppose simply because the 
other party proposes. There must be grounds of opposition more 
relative than that if you would satisfy the American people, and I 
am sure that the Democratic Party will not always be deceived by 
the solemn face of an apparent wisdom which sometimes proves to 
be nothing but that ordinary cunning which overreaches itself. 

Mr. President, my own feeling about this policy in regard to 
Panama I can best express by comparison with the great event 
which we are about to celebrate at St. Louis. When Mr. Jefferson 
bought the Louisiana territory in 1803, he met with deep opposition, 
chiefly from men representing my own part of the country. They 
were honorable, high-minded men, although they made then a great 
mistake. But what I wish to call attention to is this: Mr. Jefferson 
believed that when he made that purchase he was transcending his 
constitutional powers. I do not think that he was; posterity does 
not think so ; but he thought so at the time, and even went so far as 
to suggest the passage of a constitutional amendment. And yet, 
thinking so, he went boldly on and performed what I regard as the 
greatest act of his life; did what I consider one of the great acts of 
American history; certainly reared to himself the most splendid and 
enduring monument that any man could rear. Mr. President, there 
has been no occasion here for any man to doubt about constitutional 
powers. Laws and constitutions are not disregarded by men as 
familiar with the history of their country as the President and the 
Secretary of State. The Secretary of State is one of the most ac- 
complished men who ever held that great place. I doubt if anyone 
has ever rivaled him in his familiarity with what has gone before and 
with the acts of all his predecessors. , The President and the Secre- 
tary of State have regarded this question with the deep sense of re- 
sponsibility which comes upon men who in high executive position 
are called upon to take a momentous step. I believe they acted as 
patriots and as farseeing Americans; and when that canal is com- 
pleted — and I hope not many years will pass until that happens — I 
believe that then the voice of the American people will acclaim the 
action of this administration, which threw open the gateway be- 
tween the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, even as they acclaim the 
action of Jefferson when he bought the territory of Louisiana. 

Mr. President, I had meant to stop here, but these are days when 
new events tread fast upon each other's heels. This morning I had 
the pleasure of reading the account of a great banquet in New York 
and I can not properly finish without an allusion to something that 
was said there. It seemed to me a most interesting occasion. 
Tammany Hall and the remnants of the Democratic reform admin- 
istration nestling under the wings of Mr. David B. Hill. I do not 
know which was the lion and which were the lambs, but they were 
certainly all lying down together. [Laughter.] Among others 
present was a very distinguished citizen of my own State, whom I 



PANAMA. 45 

am very proud and happy to call my personal friend. I very rarely 
agree with him on any political question, but he made a single state- 
ment last night with which I think I am in more or less agreement. 
He referred in a picturesque way to the dreadful career that has been 
run by the Republican Party since it came into power in 1896. He 
said that we had passed from " a needless war with Spain to a wanton 
war with Colombia." 

"Needless war with Spain." Mr. President, I am inclined to 
think that the adjective was well chosen. If, when the first stir- 
rings for independence had come in that island, the administration 
of Mr. Cleveland had behaved with sense and courage; if they had 
told Spain that the time had come when the United States could no 
longer hold back and that Cuba must be free, I have always believed — '■ 
I believed then, and I believe now — that Cuba would have obtained 
her independence, perhaps after some protracted negotiations, but 
without any war by us. I have always thought that if that admin-, 
istration, instead of taking counsel with the minister of Spain and a 
great sugar planter in Cuba, had been guided by a sound and brave 
American spirit before Spain had squandered blood and treasure in, 
the island, we might indeed have been saved from the war. 

And, Mr. President, I look forward with great interest and great 
pleasure to the picture that was there drawn by the ex-SecretarJr 
of State when he eulogized the last Democratic President. Ap- 
parently in 20 years he is the only candidate they can produce, and 
Mr. Olney seems to think he is the only one they can run. Very well, 
Mr. President, whatever his strength or whatever his weakness, I can 
not refrain from saying that his nomination would present me at 
least with one great source of pleasure. His administration has 
never been discussed. I do not regard the Democratic Party — this, 
I suppose, is a partisan remark, but I shall make it— I do not, I sa}^, 
regard the Democratic Party as always abounding in good sense, but 
they had too much sense to fight the campaign of 1896 on the per- 
formances of Mr. Cleveland's administration. They repudiated him 
and his administration, and we were deprived of the opportunity 
of discussing it. We may say what we will about the silver issue, 
but it was a better issue for the Democratic Party to meet the country 
on than what had gone before; and when I saw the accounts of this 
delightful banquet in New York and read those inspiriting speeches 
and observed the Democratic Party once more, through its chosen 
leaders there present, preparing to stand across the pathway of 
American progress and proposing to put at their head the man who 
last held power in their name I confess my spirits rose higher than 
ever about Republican prospects. I thought of what a pleasure 
it would be to contrast the policy which tried to set up Liliuokalani 
in Hawaii with the policy of the Republican Party which has made 
those islands a part of the United States; to contrast the tariff which 
they passed, and which their own President called the " tariff of 
perfidy and dishonor," with the tariff we passed; to examine the 
history of the loans which they made in a time of profound peace to 
the bankers of New York with an interest rate far above what the 
United States could borrow at even then, and contrast them with 
the popular loan which we made in time of war; above all I should 
like to compare that era of panic and depression with the prosperity 
which followed. The whole field fairly bristles with delightful con- 



46 PANAMA. 

trasts. I think, Mr. President, that nothing could be happier for 
us — and we have had a great deal of good fortune in time past 
showered on us by our Democratic friends — than to have them 
nominate the last Democratic reform President, with the agreeable 
record of his last administration as a theme for debate, on a policy 
of sustaining Colombia and opposing the United States in digging 
the canal at Panama. [Manifestations of applause in the galleries.] 

APPENDIX. 

Mr. Lodge. I wish to ask that there may be printed three memo- 
randa which I have received from the State Department. They are 
copies of memoranda in Jefferson's manuscripts — the memorandum 
of Mr. Jefferson when Secretary of State, which was made for Presi- 
dent Washington but not sent to the Senate, in regard to the ap- 
pointment of the first ministers abroad; the second in regard to the 
recognition of the French Republic, and the third as to the pro- 
visional army. 

They are very interesting memoranda from Mr. Jefferson on the 
point of recognition and executive power, which has been under 
discussion here. I am sure the first has never been printed. I am 
not sure about the other two, but they are all very apt. I should 
like to have them printed as part of my remarks, if there be no 
objection. They are very brief. 

The President pro tempore. Does the Senator desire to have them 
printed as part of the remarks which he has just made ? 

Mr. Lodge. Yes; following what I have just said. 

The President pro tempore. Is there objection. The Chair hears 
none, and that order will be made. 

The memoranda referred to are as follows : 

APPOINTMENT OF FIRST MINISTERS, ETC., ABROAD. 

[Memorandum of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, made in January, 1792, but not sent to the 

Senate.] 

Gentlemen of the Senate: Your House has been pleased to communicate to me 
their resolutions, purporting a decision by them that it is expedient to * * * from 
whence an application arises that in their opinion they might have decided that no 
such appointments were expedient. 

After mature consideration and consultation I am of opinion that the Constitution 
has made the President the sole competent judge to what places circumstances render 
it expedient that ambassadors or other public ministers should be sent and of what 
grade they should be; and that it has ascribed to the Senate no executive act but the 
single one of giving or withholding their consent to the person nominated. 

I think it my duty, therefore, to protest, and I do protest against the validity of 
any resolutions of the Senate asserting or implying any right in that House to exercise 
any executive authority but the single one before mentioned. 

It is scarcely necessary to add that nothing herein is meant to question their right 
to concur in making treaties, this being considered not as a branch of executive but 
of legislative powers, placed by the Constitution under peculiar modifications. 

RECOGNITION OF FRENCH REVOLUTIONISTS. 

[Memorandum of Jefferson, Mar. 12, 1792.] 

The President now sends Lear to me to ask what answer he shall give the com- 
mittee, and particularly whether he shall add to it that ''in making the communica- 
tion it was not his expectation that the House should give any answer." I told 
Mr. Lear that I thought the House had a right independently of legislation to express 
sentiments on other subjects. That when these subjects did not belong to any other 
branch, they would publish them by their own authority; that in the present case, 



PANAMA. 47 

which respected a foreign nation, the President being the organ of our action with 
other nations, the House wo'ild satisfy their duty if instead of a direct communication 
they sliDUld pass their sentiments through the President; that if expressing a senti- 
ment were really an invasion of executive power, it was so faint a one that it would 
be difficult to demonstrate it to the public, and to a public partial to the French 
Revolution and not disposed to consider the approbation of it from any quarter as 
improper; that the Senate, indeed, had given many indications of their wish to in- 
vade the executive power; the Representatives had done it in one instance which 
was indeed mischievous and alarming — that of giving orders to the heads of the execu- 
tive departments without consulting the President — but that the late vote in direct- 
ing the Secretary of the Treasvry to report ways and means, though carried, was 
carried by so small a majority and by the aid of Members so notoriously under a local 
influence on that question as to give the hope that the practice would be arrested 
and the constitutional course be taken up of asking the President to have information 
laid before them: but that in the present instance it was so far from being clearly an 
invasion of the Executive, and would be so little approved by the general voice, 
that I could not advise the President to express any dissatisfaction at the vote of the 
House, and I gave Lear in writing what I thought should be his answer. 

RAISING OP PROVISIONAL ARMY WHEN WAR EXPECTED WITH FRANCE. 
[Functions of the legislative and executive branches. Memorandum of Jefferson in 1798.] 

The legislature may raise armies, but can not prescribe the purposes for which they 
shall be used. The army being raised, the Constitution transfers the use of them to 
the President, which is paramount to anv law limiting the use. 

The legislature may erect offices, but thev can not restrain the appointment of the 
officers to any qualification of persons, for this would be to restrain a power given by 
the Constitution to the President without restraint. 

The Constitution authorizes the President to appoint foreign ministers. The 
legislature can not refuse giving money for them without breach of a moral obligation. 

If a law raises an army for a long term of years, though the Constitution forbids an 
■appropriation for them for more than two years, yet they can not refuse to renew it 
every two years without breach of a moral obligation. 

The Constitution gi^es the President and Senate a power to make treaties. If in 
these they give subsidies or money for other purposes, the legislature can not refuse 
the money without a breach of moral obligation. 

The Constitution leaves the raisins; of armies to the discretion of Congress. There- 
fore Congress may leave it to the discretion of the President. (So argued by Ross, 
Reid, Sedgwick, Stockton, and others in the Senate on the provisional army, and 
by Otis, Dana, Sewell, Harper, Rutledge, Craik, and others in the debate on the 
•same bill Apr. 24, and by Mr. Pinckney in the debate on the bill for the provisional 
army, May 10, 1798.) 

The Constitution leaves the levying of taxes to the discretion of Congress. There- 
fore Congress may leave it to the discretion of the President. (Harper, in the same 
debate.) 

The Constitution leaves the power of legislation to Congress. Therefore Congress 
may leave it to the President. (Necessary consequence from the premises.) 

If the President informs Congress that in his opinion there is imminent danger of 
invasion, Congress is bound to act in conformity to it without examining the grounds 
of the opinion. (Said by Otis; see Gallatin's speech on the provisional army, May 
10, 1798. See Bayard's speech against juries and the superior advantages of a trial 
by the court. Aurora, Aug. 2.) 

STATEMENT OP MR. OLNEY, SECRETARY OF STATE. 

[Washington Evening Star, Dec. 19, 1896.] 

I have no objection to stating my own views of the resolution respecting the inde- 
pendence of the so-called Republic of Cuba, which, it is reported, is to be laid before 
the Senate on Monday. Indeed, as there are likely to be serious misapprehensions 
regarding such a resolution, both in this country and abroad, and as such apprehen- 
sions may have serious results of a grave character, it is perhaps my duty to point 
out that the resolution, if passed by the Senate, can probably be regarded only as an 
expression of opinion by the eminent gentlemen who vote for it in the Senate, and 
if passed by the House of Representatives can only be regarded as another expression 
of opinion by the eminent gentlemen who vote for it in the House. The power to 
recognize the so-called Republic of Cuba as an independent State rests exclusively 



48 



PANAMA. 




with the Executive. A resolution on the subject by the Ser 015 818 557 

by both bodies or by one, whether concurrent or joint, is inoperawve-oo icgioiouuu c.™ - 
is important only as advice of great weight tendered to the Executive regarding the 
manner in which he shall exercise his constitutional functions. The operation and 
effect of the proposed resolution, therefore, even if passed by both Houses of Congress- 
by a two-thirds vote, are perfectly plain. It may inflame popular passion both in. 
this country and elsewhere; may thus put in peril the lives and property of American, 
citizens who are resident and traveling abroad, and will certainly obstruct and 
perhaps defeat the best efforts of this Government to afford such citizens due protec- 
tion. But, except in these ways and unless advice embodied in the resolution shall 
lead the Executive to revise conclusions already reached and officially declared, the- 
resolution will be without effect and will leave unaltered the attitude of the Govern- 
ment toward the two contending parties in Cuba. 



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Conservation Resources 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

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015 818 557 A 



